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I. INTRODUCTION
The extensive public policy debates about the breakdown of the American
family often focus on two important phenomena: the high percentage of marriages
with children that end in divorce and the large numbers of children born to
unmarried mothers.' Both trends have caused deep concern across the political
spectrum, although the solutions proposed have differed widely.2 Divorce, which
increased dramatically beginning in the 1970's,3 has gained widespread attention
through evidence that it has undermined the financial security and overall
development of many children of divorced parents.4 These negative impacts of
divorce on children have led to recent calls to make divorce more difficult, perhaps
by returning to a fault-based divorce regime.5 Others have advocated improving
the divorce process for children through parent education on the effects of divorce
and mediation to increase cooperative parenting by divorced parents.6
1 See Mary Ann Mason, et al., Introduction, in ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW
CENTURY 1 (Mary Ann Mason, et al. eds. 1998) [hereinafter ALL OUR FAMILIES].
2 See id. at 3. While politicians have focused their concern for child well-being on divorce and
single motherhood, many social scientists have focused on factors linked to poverty, including parental
joblessness, low wage work, limited education, high ratio of children to adults in the home, frequent moves
and social isolation, as powerful links to the poor physical and mental health, school achievement, and
problematic social behaviors of children living in poverty. See Green Litton Fox, Children's Well-Being:
Clues and Caveats from Social Research, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1075, 1077 (1999).
3 See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the United States, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 29, 30 (Spring 1994).
4 See Richard E. Behrman & Linda Sandham Quinn, Children and Divorce: Overview and Analysis,
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 4, 6 (Spring 1994); Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: A Society in
Search of a Policy, in ALL OUR FAMILIES 66, supra note 1; Paul R. Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children
to Their Parents' Divorce, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 143, 145-46 (Spring 1994); Robert Hughes, Session
#2, The Effects of Divorce on Children, <http://www.hec.ohio-state.edu/famlife/divorce/effects.htm> (visited
Jan. 2, 2001) (finding children from divorced families are on average somewhat worse off than children who
have lived in intact families, demonstrating more difficulty in school, more behavior problems, more negative
self-concepts, more problems with peers, and more trouble getting along with their parents).
5 Professor Lynn Wardle, a proponent of returning fault to divorce law, cites a growing literature by
opponents and proponents of fault-based divorce regimes. See Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn
of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L. Q. 783, 784 nn. 4 & 5 (1999) [hereinafter
Wardle, Divorce Reform].
6 See, e.g., Robert M. Gordon, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435 (1998);
Barbara Stark, Guys & Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce, Feminist Theory, and Family Law
Doctrine, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 293 (1997).
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The dramatic increase during the 1970's and 1980's in the number of
unmarried mothers who gave birth to children has also drawn the sustained
attention of policymakers.7  Although the rate of births to unmarried mothers
leveled off and then declined during the 1990's," policymakers continue to focus on
the greater risks faced by children born out of marriage.9 Lawmakers have enacted
punitive measures regarding single mothers, such as denying increased welfare
benefits to women who have additional children while they are receiving financial
assistance.'0 They have also required women applying for assistance to name the
fathers of their children and seek child support from them.1
These punitive measures have been accompanied by efforts to improve the
status of children born out of wedlock. The United States Supreme Court,
recognizing that laws placing burdens on children born out of marriage manifested
society's condemnation of the parents' conduct, has rejected statutes that penalize
nonmarital children. 2 The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 [hereinafter UPA
(1973)] was adopted by a minority of states in the 1970's and 1980's. It sought to
equalize the treatment of marital and nonmarital children and provided for paternal
identification and support of children born out of marriage.' 3 The identification of
unwed fathers has been aided significantly by new technologies that identify or
exclude men as biological fathers to a very high degree of certainty.
14
Largely invisible to those engaged in these vociferous public debates about
single motherhood and divorce has been a group of children whose status and
family relationships have been dramatically altered by the intersection of these
trends. They are children who appear to be born into marriage, but whose status as
children of the marriage comes into question. These children are hit by a double
whammy-first, they endure the trauma of divorce, and second, often either during
7 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 66, U.S. (1985) (109th ed.
1989) (stating that between 1950 and 1986, the percentage of children born to unmarried women rose from
4% to 23.4%).
8 See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program, Third Annual Report to
Congress, August 2000, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 92,
<http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opre/annual3.doc> (reporting that the birth rate for unmarried women
ages 15-44 was 46.9 in 1994,44.8 in 1996,44.0 in 1997,44.3 in 1998 and 43.9 in 1999).
9 See Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157, 157-59
(1999) (reporting that children in single parent households are more likely to experience poor health,
behavioral problems, delinquency, and low educational attainment than are their peers in intact families, and
that as adults they have higher rates of poverty, early childbearing, and divorce).
10 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iil) (West 2000). The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.), which changed welfare from a longterm entitlement program for needy families into a
temporary assistance program, was motivated in large part by the belief that welfare had encouraged the birth
and rearing of children outside of marriage. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3) & (4).
11 See Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996
Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L. Q. 519,532-35 (1996).
12 See infra Part 11.
13 See UNiF. PARENTAGE ACr (superseded 2000) [hereinafter UPA (1973)].
14 See id. at 289.
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or subsequent to the divorce, their parentage is disputed. s Questions about their
status may be raised at any age and at any time in the life of their parents' marriage
or divorce. In earlier times, the marital presumption of paternity-the presumption
that a child is fathered by his or her mother's husband-was largely irrebuttable. 6
Although all states continue to recognize a marital presumption of paternity in the
husband, few continue to treat the presumption as irrebuttable or strictly limit the
circumstances in which it can be rebutted. 17 Resolution of the deeply unsettling
questions raised by challenges to the marital presumption of paternity has gained
little attention from state legislatures and varies widely among state courts. 18
State laws targeted at identifying and collecting child support from unwed
fathers have had the collateral effect of widening the circumstances in which the
marital presumption of paternity can be challenged.' 9 Most states have expanded
the categories of persons who may challenge the marital presumption and the
circumstances in which such challenges are successful. 20 Although many state laws
do not provide courts with clear direction, others now permit parties to successfully
rebut the marital presumption of paternity through genetic testing.21 These state
laws express the legislative belief that biological ties are not only an adequate basis
for parental responsibility, but that they are, except for adoption and technological
reproduction, the only basis for legal father-child relationships that will withstand
court challenge.
Courts, however, have often expressed uneasiness with this strong reliance
on biology. They face situations in which a paternity determination based solely on
the outcome of genetic testing will greatly disturb the status quo.22 Quite suddenly,
based on the results of genetic testing, men who are outside the legal family
structure will gain rights and responsibilities toward one or more of the children in
15 See Pennsylvania Judiciary Committee Public Hearings on Senate Bill 516, DNA Testing to
Determine Paternity (Monday, April 12, 1999) [hereinafter Woodhouse Testimony] (written testimony by
Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law,
submitted to House Judiciary Committee, at 6).
16 See infra Part II.
17 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
18 See discussion infra Part V.
19 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570 (West 1994) (declaring a compelling state interest in
establishing paternity for all children.) The federal government requires states to establish procedures to
identify the paternity of children born to unmarried mothers through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 and the Family Support Act of 1988. See W. Craig Williams, Note, The Paradox of Paternity
Establishment: As Rights Go Up, Rates Go Down, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 261 (1999).
20 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1 (Supp. 1999) (removing time limitation for presumed father to
use genetic testing to challenge paternity even after prior paternity adjudication); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1415
(2) (listing eight different types of parties who can bring a paternity action).
21 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-14-7-1 (1997) (declaring that blood test results create a presumption of
paternity regardless of mother's marriage to another man); Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 516-17 (Ind.
1997) (finding that presumption of paternity created by genetic test results preempts presumption of paternity
created by marriage to mother).
22 See, e.g., Alinda V. v. Alfredo V., 177 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
[Vol. 102:547
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that family,23 men who unknowingly established loving relationships with their
wife's children will become legal strangers to those children,24 and children will
lose the only father they have ever known,25 often with little hope of establishing a
father-child relationship with another man.
This Article examines the tension between the trend toward basing
parentage on biology and the heart-rending conflicts that courts must resolve.
Many courts have applied a wide range of procedural and equitable doctrines to
prevent deciding whether husbands, who later discover they are not genetically
related to one or more of their children, should retain or lose legal fatherhood. 26
Courts often attribute their acceptance or rejection of these doctrines to briefly
stated assumptions about fatherhood that have little or no theoretical or research-
based support.27
Where do these legislative and judicial assumptions come from? The
social iconography of fatherhood is based on both biology and marriage. The deep
cultural assumption that fatherhood depends on both biology and marriage can be
seen in the popular media. "Fathers" are married, biological fathers like Ozzie in
"Ozzie and Harriet," Fred McMurray in "My Three Sons," Homer Simpson in
"The Simpsons," and perhaps the greatest father icon of them all, Bill Cosby.?
8
Only recently has this iconography begun to fall apart, and this splintering
has elicited deep social ambivalence. 29 When Dr. Peter Benton on the popular
show "E.R." is told by the unmarried mother that he may not be the biological
father of his son, he is deeply torn about whether to get genetic tests.30 Even Mr.
Fatherhood himself, Bill Cosby, was alleged to have fathered a daughter out-of-
2 See, e.g., Willmon v. Hunter, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ark. 1988).
24 See, e.g, Golden v. Golden, 942 S.W.2d 282, 284-85 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (rebutting husband's
paternity on basis of genetic testing results in husband's loss of joint custody of child although husband's
standing in loco parentis to child entitles him to challenge mother's custody on limited basis of mother's
unfitness).
25 See Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 551 (Md. 1986) (finding equitable estoppel not a bar to denial of
duty to provide child support).
25 See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
27 See infra Part V.
28 See Jamie Faulkner, Fathers and Sins, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, November 8, 1996 available
in 1996 WL 17458879; Noreen O'Leary, A dose of daddy love 'Full House' is the real dealfor young viewer,
THE FORT-WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 23, 1992 at 1; Father's Day, Reflect on How He Has Changed,
THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 16, 1996 at 02B; Angela Cook, Note & Comment, Should the Right of
Publicity Protection Be Extended to Actors in Characters They Portray? 9 DEPAUL L. J. ARTS & ENT. 309,
351 n. 69-71 (1999) (describing lovable fatherly character created by Bill Cosby).
29 Martha Minow has commented on a similar deep division in our lack of consensus on the
definition of family. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 305 (1990).
30 See Bernard Weintraub, After Major Surgery, ER is Back on Its Feet - For Time Being, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 15, 1999 at D12, available in 1999 WL 6605139 (describing character of Dr.
Peter Benton faced with decision of whether to obtain genetic testing of his son).
2000]
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wedlock during his longterm marriage.3
1
We as a society do not know what to make of the separation of biological
fatherhood and marriage. On the one hand, the cultural assumption that biological
parentage and marriage are inseparable has worked to the detriment of loving,
committed, non-traditional families headed by single parents or unmarried
heterosexual or homosexual partners.32 Our failure to confront and resolve the
increasing separation of biological fatherhood and marriage, however, also
disadvantages children of uncertain biological parenthood who are born into
traditional marriages.
The deep social and cultural ambivalence occasioned by the splintering of
fatherhood into scientifically-verifiable biological and social relationships is
reflected in the doctrinal chaos in the law concerning the marital presumption of
paternity. There is an extraordinary lack of consistency among the states and often
within an individual state. This ad hoc approach to the situations facing children
born during marriage whose paternity is called into question is deeply troubling.
Some commentators have focused on particular questions that arise, such
as the constitutional rights of biological fathers to assert paternity over children
born while the mother is married to another man.33 Scholars have yet to
methodically examine the wide variety of circumstances in which the marital
presumption of paternity comes into question or to place the issues faced by these
children into the broader contexts of divorce, the status of children born out of
wedlock, technological advances in identification of biological relationships, and
societal efforts to place responsibility for child support on parents, not on the
broader society.34 They have also failed to evaluate and examine the varying
interests and needs of the involved individuals, and the treatment that has been
accorded their various interests. The failure to resolve the difficult questions that
arise in these situations is apparent in the recently adopted revision of the UPA.s
31 See Tai Park, The 'Inherently Wrongful' Doctrine in Federal Law, N.Y.L.J. 1, March 7, 2000, at
1, col.1 (describing extortion conviction of Autumn Jackson, who claimed to be Bill Cosby's daughter and
threatened to expose their relationship unless Cosby paid her a specified sum of money and explaining that no
DNA tests were ever conducted to determine whether Cosby was her biological father, an allegation he
vehemently denied).
32 See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power, 3
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495 (1993) [hereinafter Fellows, Law of Legitimacy](evaluating how the marital
presumption of paternity disadvantages African-American women and children); Theresa Glennon, Binding
the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective on Second-Parent Adoptions, 7 TEMPLE POL. & CtV. RTs. L.
REV 255, 258 (1998) (finding that in some jurisdictions second-parent adoption is available without
relinquishment of rights of other parent only when current parent and proposed adoptive parent are legally
married).
33 See, e.g., David V. Hadek, Why the Policy Behind the Irrebuttable Presumption of Paternity Will
Never Die, 26 Sw. U. L. REV. 359 (1997).
34 But see Chris W. Altenbernd, Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law's Failure in Privette
and Daniel Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219 (1999) (discussing a wide range of issues
concerning this dilemma under Florida state law).
35 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Parentage Act
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This Article is a preliminary step toward the broader analysis needed to
develop a consistent and sensitive approach to the difficult issues raised when the
paternity of children born during marriage is called into question. Although most
would agree that the legal regime should serve the interests of children caught in
these conflicts, deep disagreements exist over what children's primary interests are,
how best to protect them, and what should be done when the interests of children
come into conflict with other important values, such as the rights of their mothers,
presumed fathers, and alleged biological fathers.
As a start to this analysis, this Article provides background information on
the changing status of children born out of wedlock and the technology that has
recently evolved that permits a high degree of certainty in scientific testing to
identify biological fathers. Second, this Article briefly outlines divorce trends over
the last thirty years and the effects that the high divorce rate has had on the well-
being of children. The Article then reviews the history of the marital presumption
of paternity and analyzes the general, although as yet inconsistent, trend in state
law to resolve all paternity disputes on the basis of genetic testing and the
confusing and ill-fitting array of judicial doctrines many courts have employed
when faced with these difficult issues. This Article also reviews the UPA (1973)
and the UPA (2000) to evaluate their approaches to the paternity of children born
during their mother's marriage.
Finally, the Article examines the widely differing assumptions that govern
the courts' use of these doctrines and calls for a re-examination of those
assumptions as part of a process of reconstructing the legal parentage of children
born during marriage. Only careful scrutiny of these societal assumptions will
enable us to evaluate and rethink the tangled doctrinal web that fails by any
measure to protect the interests of the involved children.
I. THE CHANGING STATUS OF NONMARrrAL CHILDREN
Legal systems have long distinguished between children born to parents
who are married and children born to unmarried parents. From Ancient Roman law
to the development of English common law, children born to unmarried parents
were filius nullius, no one's son.36 They had no right to support or inheritance from
their parents, and in some time periods in parts of Europe, they were actively
discriminated against in all realms of life.37
Early American law picked up the discriminatory features of English
common law, and well into the twentieth century, children born to unmarried
parents were unable to obtain support or inherit from their unmarried fathers.38
Initial efforts at reform by state legislation were sporadic.39 As late as the 1960's,
36 See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOcIAL POLICY 2-5 (1971) [hereinafter
KRAUSE, ILLEGrrimAcY].
37 See id. at 3.
38 See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibilty and the Public
Interest, 24 FAM. L. Q. 1, 4 (1990)
39 See KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY, supra note 36, at 21-42.
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substantive legal equality of children regardless of the marital status of their parents
was not fully accepted.40 Despite this, the rate of children born outside marriage
increased dramatically. 41 Thus, the legal status and entitlements of children born
outside marriage became a topic of deep concern and attention.42
One source of attention came through civil rights actions alleging that state
laws that treated children born to unmarried parents differently than those born to
married parents were discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Beginning in 1968, a series of United States Supreme
Court decisions required equal legal treatment of all children, regardless of the
marital status of their parents.43 For example, the Supreme Court rejected a state
law that denied nonmarital children paternal child support, holding that
once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of
children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no
constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential
right to a child simply because her natural father has not married her
mother. For a State to do so is 'illogical and unjust.' 44
In the wake of these decisions, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted the UPA (1973). 4s It had two primary purposes:
first, to create a model state statute that would implement the equal legal rights of
children born to unmarried parents;46 and second, to improve states' systems of
child support enforcement.47
The UPA (1973) sought to improve and equalize the status of children
born outside marriage in a variety of ways. The UPA (1973) stated that "[t]he
parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent,
regardless of the marital status of the parents., 48 This statement, although widely
accepted now, was only in the process of gaining acceptance in 1973.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 257-61.
42 See id. at 260. Professor Krause notes that laws that discriminated against children on the basis of
illegitimacy disproportionately negatively affected African-American children. See id. See also, UPA
(1973), sripra note 13, at 289; Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of
Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1976).
43 In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana statute that
denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother was unconstitutional.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1972), the Supreme Court held that
workmen's compensation benefits related to the death of their father must be paid to dependent children, even
if they were born out of wedlock and were never formally acknowledged by their father.
44 Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 536-38 (1973) (per curiam).
45 UPA (1973), supra note 13.
46 See id. at 289.
See id.
48 Id. § 2.
[Vol. 102:547
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The UPA (1973) was also designed to ease the process of implementing
these new equal rights. It set forth a variety of presumptions concerning the
paternity of a child. Although it maintained the common law marital presumption,
it included two additional presumptions of paternity intended to identify the legal
father of children born outside of marriage.49 It created presumptions of paternity
where a man has received a minor child into his home and openly held out the child
as his natural child and where a man has acknowledged his paternity in writing and
filed that document with the appropriate body.50
Procedures to determine paternity when no presumption was applicable or
a presumption was challenged were established by the UPA (1973). It also dealt
with evidentiary issues, including the admission of blood tests and evidence of
sexual intercourse between the mother and alleged father. 51 It required that parties
be provided counsel and that children whose paternity is at issue be made parties to
the action and provided legal representation. In addition to establishing a court's
power to enforce child support orders, it also provided for notice to alleged
biological fathers prior to a child's adoption.- Throughout, the uniform act sought
to ensure the support and protection of children born out of wedlock.
The protection of children born out of wedlock was hampered by the lack
of accurate tests to prove paternity. Until the beginning of the twentieth century,
there was no reliable scientific test available to identify the fathers of children born
out of wedlock. In 1901, blood group testing was discovered by Dr. Karl
Landsteiner at the University of Vienna.54 Blood group testing identified genetic
markers in the blood by analyzing specific blood type antigens.5" Early types of
blood group testing were often unable to exclude a man as the biological father.5 6
By the late 1970's human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tests had become able to both
exclude and establish the probability of biological paternity.57 Scientific research
49 See id. at 289.
50 See UPA (1973), supra note 13, § 4.
51 Seeid. §§ 11, 12.
52 See iL §§ 9, 19.
53 See id. §§ 17, 24.
54 See Ira Mark Ellman & David Kaye, Probabilities and Proof. Can HLA and Blood Group Testing
Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1979); Keefe & Failey, A Trial of Bastardy is a Trial of the
Blood, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 72 (1948); 1 SCHATKiN, DISPUTED PATERNrTY PROCEEDINGS § 3.09 (4th ed. 1981).
55 See Ronald J. Richards, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting and Paternity Testing, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 609, 612 (1989) [hereinafter DNA Fingerprinting]; Ellman, supra note 54, at 1135.
56 Dr. Landsteiner's 1901 discovery included only four blood type groups: A, B, AB and 0. ABO
typing could exclude a man as the biological father only about 14% of the time. In 1927, Dr. Landsteiner
discovered M and N blood systems and exclusions became possible in about 33% of contested paternity
cases. By 1940, Dr. Landsteiner's discovery of the Rh factor increased the exclusion rate to approximately
55%. See Patricia Bundschuh Blumberg, Note, Human Leukocyte Antigen Testing: Technology Versus
Policy in Cases of Disputed Parentage, 36 VAND. L. REv.1587, 1589-90 (1983) [hereinafter Blumberg,
Disputed Parentage].
57 See Elman, supra note 54, at 1138.
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moved ahead quickly, and by the late 1980's, DNA, or "genetic marker" testing
provided probabilities of paternity greater than 99%.8
As genetic testing for paternity increased in accuracy, so, too, did judicial
and legislative acceptance of test results as evidence. Courts first began to admit
blood test evidence in paternity actions in the 1930's, 5 9 when blood test evidence
could only occasionally exclude men as biological fathers.60 Despite a growing
acceptance of blood test evidence,61 some courts refused to admit the results62 or
give them conclusive weight.6 Legislative acceptance also came slowly. In 1952
the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity64 [hereinafter "UABT"]
was proposed in an effort to resolve problems of admissibility and weight that
should be given to the blood tests. One provision in the UABT made exculpatory
blood test evidence determinative.65 However, most states that adopted the UABT
omitted this provision66 In 1960 the Uniform Paternity Act67 was formulated. It
substantively followed the UABT but was adopted by few states.6
The UPA (1973) included a provision dealing with blood test results, but it
lacked any clarity as to what courts should do with such evidence. 69  The UPA
(1973) stated that "evidence relating to paternity may include.., blood test results,
58 See Christopher L. Blakesley, Scientific Testing and Proof of Paternity, 57 LA. L. REV. 379, 388
(1997); Sylvia Ianucci, Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Standard for Admissibility,
1988 UTAH L. REV. 717 [hereinafter Utah Standardfor Admissibility].
59 See Ellman, supra note 54 at 1135. See, e.g., Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479,480 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
60 See Ellman, supra note 54, at 1136. See, e.g., State v. Damm, 252 N.W. 7 (S.D. 1933) (refusing to
admit blood tests in case of first impression to determine paternity of child allegedly conceived during rape
because of insufficiency of scientific fact); Commonwealth v. Krutsick, 30 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1943) (deciding tests not perfected enough to provide decisive proof as to paternity); Sheperd v. Sheperd, 765
N.W.2d 374, 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (ordering blood group testing as requested by the plaintiff to
overcome presumption of paternity).
61 See Haugen v. Swanson, 16 N.W.2d 900, 902 (Minn. 1944); Walker v. Clark, 58 N.E.2d 773, 777
(Ohio 1944) (admitting expert testimony as to findings of recognized blood group test into evidence but
determining that it was not conclusive.); Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670, 672 (Me. 1949).
62 See People v. Nichols, 67 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Mich. 1954) (finding that testimony concerning the
results of blood tests to establish defendant's paternity was prejudicial to him and could not be admitted);
Freeman v. Morris, 102 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1951) (determining that evidence regarding results of blood tests
used to establish paternity is prejudicial and therefore not admissible).
6 The court in Hanson v. Hanson, 249 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Minn.1977), reviewed the weight accorded
exclusionary test results among the jurisdictions. See also Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442, 451 (Cal. Dist.
App. 1946); State v. Camp, 209 S.E.2d 754, 755-56 (N.C. 1974) (admitting blood test evidence, but finding it
not conclusive, allowing jury to find that defendant was the natural father despite the test results).
64 UNIF. AcT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY § 4 (1952).
65 See Ellman, supra note 54, at 1136-37.
66 See Ellman, supra note 54, at 1137.
67 UNIF. AcT ON PATERNITY, 9B U.L.A 347 (1960).
68 See Ellman, supra note 54, at 1137.
69 See UPA (1973), supra note 13, § 12(3). See also Mary Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and
Fantasy, 65 TuL. L. REV. 585, 589 (1991).
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weighted in accordance with evidence, if available, of te statistical probability of
the alleged father's paternity.",7 0 The UPA (1973) recognized that genetic testing
might be able to accurately identify paternity as well as exclude paternity.
However, it did not guide courts as to how much weight to give such evidence in
relationship to other kinds of evidence before it. Thus, although the UPA (1973)
provided clear guidance in many cases, in those cases where two presumptions of
paternity clashed, courts were given little guidance about how to reconcile these
clashes.
Although the UPA (1973) greatly aided in the identification of the
paternity of children born out of wedlock, such identification does not clarify the
role of unwed fathers. Many children born out of wedlock are profoundly affected
by the absence of paternal economic support and the absence of a loving father-
child relationship. Until recently, federal and state law have focused solely on the
economic implications of fatherlessness.7' Enforcement of child support
payments-rather than encouraging father-child bonding-is the centerpiece of
federal and state law concerning children born out of wedlock. A primary
emphasis is on preventing the public from providing financial assistance for
children.72 Thus, only impoverished women who turn to the state for financial
assistance must identify their children's father and seek child support for their
children.73 Women who are economically self-sufficient and bear children out of
wedlock may choose whether to name their child's father and seek child support
from him.
Federal policymakers have focused on the high rates of children born to
unmarried mothers who were receiving welfare assistance through the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program. The "Child Support Enforcement
Act" passed in 1974 required states to establish the paternity of children born out
of wedlock and secure support from the identified fathers. 74 Congress quickly
followed this up with legislation that required the mothers of children born out of
wedlock to cooperate with efforts to identify their children's father.75 As a result,
states needed objective scientific evidence to aid their efforts to identify biological
70 Ellman, supra note 54, at 1137. See also Utah Standard for Admissibility, supra note 58, at 720;
Blumberg, Disputed Parentage, supra note 56, at 1594, 1603 (citing Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Washington and Wyoming as among states adopting the Uniform Parentage
Act). California adopted the UPA (1973) but not the provision concerning statistical evidence of likelihood
of paternity. Ten states retained statutes permitting introduction of blood tests as affirmative evidence in
courts if deemed relevant. Other courts used judicial notice to admit statistical probabilities if no statute
existed. See id.
71 Only recently have federal legislative efforts focused on a broader definition of "responsible
fatherhood." To date, none of initiatives have become law. See, e.g., H.R. 3073, 106th Cong. (1999).
72 For a discussion of the modem move from public support of children through welfare law to
private support of children through child support law, see Laura W. Morgan, Family Law at 2000: Private
and Public Support of the Family: From Welfare Law to Poor Law, 33 FAM. L. Q. 705, 708-14 (1999).
73 See Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
74 See Utah Standard for Admissibility, supra note 58, at 719.
75 See 42 U.S.C.§ 602(26).
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fathers accurately. Genetic testing for paternity thus gained momentum through
these federal efforts to obtain support from the fathers of children born to
unmarried mothers who received welfare assistance.7  Courts began accepting
genetic test results into evidence to identify or exclude men as biological fathers. 8
State use of genetic testing became mandatory for states that participated
in the reformed welfare assistance program enacted by Congress in 1996.79 The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act requires states to
provide for and mandate genetic testing in contested paternity cases.8" Any party
can request the testing and the test results are "admissible as evidence of paternity
without the need for foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or
accuracy, unless objection is made., 81 These statutory requirements led to a great
wave of paternity filings in the late 1990,s.82 The widespread use of genetic testing
promises to expand even further. For example, the Maryland courts are now
flooded with requests by men who were subject to earlier voluntary or involuntary
(court-ordered) paternity to reopen the issue of their paternity for genetic testing to
see if they are, in fact, biological fathers.83
The child support system for children born out of wedlock is based on the
assumption that biological fatherhood is a sufficient basis for legal and financial
responsibility for a child. Thus, the child support system focuses on the correct
identification of the biological father. It is irrelevant whether there is a social
parent-child relationship between the child and the parent. Paternity determination
and child support enforcement are not designed to foster a social relationship
between father and child.84  In some instances, child support enforcement
76 See Utah Standard for Admissibility, supra note 58, at 727.
77 See Blumberg, Disputed Parentage, supra note 56, at 1595-96.
78 See Allan Z. Litovsky & Kirsten Schultz, Scientific Evidence of Paternity: A Survey of State
Statutes, JURIMETRICS J. 79, 82-83 (1998).
79 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (1994)).
80 See 42 USC § 666(a)(5) (1994); Blakesley, supra note 58, at 380.
81 Blakesley, supra note 58, at 380-81.
82 See, e.g., Pennsylvania House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Task Force on Domestic
Relations Hearing on Custody, Family Court Reform and Economic Justice for Dependent Spouses (March
13, 1998) (statement of Judge Paul P. Pannepinto, Administrative Judge, Family Court Division, Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas) (stating that Family Court had been flooded with requests for orders of
paternity and child support).
83 In Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389, 410 (Md. 2000), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
blood and genetic tests for paternity are available to putative fathers who want to challenge prior paternity
declarations, including those entered prior to a 1995 statutory amendment permitting courts to set aside or
modify paternity declarations based on blood or genetic tests. This case has led to a flood of petitions by men
to disestablish their paternity. Interview with Jana Singer, Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University
of Maryland School of Law (Sept. 10, 2000).
84 For example, the paternity acknowledgment forms that unwed fathers are typically asked to sign in
the hospital upon the birth of their child inform fathers that signing the form will create liability for child
support but no right to visitation or custody. See Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the
Real World Intrudes Upon Academics and Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235,248 (1999).
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undermines the fragile father-child relationship that does exist, turning the parents
into adversaries. For indigent nonmarital children, then, biology rules in the
courtroom, if not in their lives.
III. THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHILDREN
Many challenges to a husband's paternity are made during divorce
proceedings or after a divorce is final. Although many courts view legal actions to
disestablish the husband's or ex-husband's paternity as separate analytically from
the broader context of the divorce and dissolution action, children may experience
the paternity dispute as part of the larger context of their parents' divorce.
85
The United States witnessed a divorce revolution beginning in the 1960s.
Prior to 1969, most states made divorce actions extremely difficult. 6 Even when
married partners agreed that they both wanted a divorce, most states required them
to show fault in order to obtain a divorce.8 ' They were required to prove that either
the husband or the wife had engaged in some serious misbehavior such as adultery,
desertion, physical or mental abuse, drunkenness, imprisonment, drug addiction or
insanity.88
Within a sixteen year period, states shifted away from a fault-based,
restrictive approach to divorce to a no-fault divorce regime that shortened waiting
periods and facilitated unilateral divorces.89 During this time, the annual divorce
rate increased from 2.5 per 1000 in 1965 to 5.2 per 1000 in 1980.90 Now, sixty-five
percent of all new marriages are predicted to end in the divorce.9' In general, the
law increasingly has left decisions about the regulation of marriage and family life
to the involved parties. 92 Married partners are no longer viewed as beholden to
each other for life. Rather, state legislatures and courts view each partner in a
marriage as independent of the other. Even spouses who have not worked during
the marriage are expected to become employable quickly and support themselves
after divorce.9"
85 See, e.g., Woodhouse Testimony, supra note 15, at 6.
86 See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 6 (1992).
87 See id.
88 See PETER N. SWISHER, ET AL., FAMILY LAW, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 769-70 (1999).
89 See id.
90 See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79,
138 (compiling data from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
91 See Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1558 (1998) (citing Larry L. Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family?
Interaction Between Demographic and Institutional Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483,485 (1990)).
92 See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443.
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Increasingly, law and social mores have accepted this view of marriage
partners as fundamentally independent persons who owe each other nothing after
divorce. This individualist model, however, raises numerous difficult issues for the
children born during the marriage. Despite their parents' new independence from
each other, the children usually are still dependent on both of their parents. This
misfit between the easy termination of marriage and the continuing needs of the
children of the marriage for focused attention from both parents has drawn
increasing attention from academics and policymakers.
Compared to children of intact marriages, children whose parents divorce
suffer on virtually every measure of well-being, whether educationally, physically,
psychologically or emotionally. 94 This suffering does not just occur at one point in
time, as it usually does for the adults engaged in divorce. A twenty-five year study
of children who were two to six years old at the time of the divorce reveals that
unlike adults, children do not move beyond their parents' breakup in a short period
of time. Instead, they experience its impact at each developmental stage. Due to
the divorce, they may receive less supervision, may need to adjust to new
stepparents and stepsiblings, and may face financial barriers to higher education.
After divorce, children usually have less contact with one parent, and sometimes
with both, particularly if the primary caretaker goes to work for the first time. 95 In
young adulthood, they may fear that their own adult relationships will fail like
those of their parents.96
In response to these concerns, legal analysts and state legislators have
proposed a variety of approaches. Some have looked to ways to prevent the
breakup of marriages in the first place. These ideas often focus on ways to make
marriage more difficult to terminate. For example, Louisiana recently adopted the
concept of "covenant marriage" which is much harder to terminate than the more
traditional form of marriage. 97 The covenant marriage legislation permits spouses
to choose a more binding, more permanent marriage by civil covenant that limits
divorce to situations involving serious breaches of the marital covenant, and
encourages the participation of the church, an institution thought to possess moral
authority and be uniquely qualified to help preserve marriages. 98 Some have
94 See id. at 1554.
95 See Robert Hughes, Jr., Demographics of Divorce: An Internet Inservice Experience for
Professionals (visited Jan. 9, 2001) <http://www.hec.ohio-state.edulfamlifeldivorcelindex.htm> (reporting
that over time the amount of contact between children and fathers diminishes: for those families who have
been divorced less than two years, about 43% of fathers had contact; 33% of those who had been divorced
three to five years ago had contact; 19% of those who had been divorced six to ten years continued contact;
and only 12% of those that had been divorced over eleven years continued contact).
96 See REGAN, supra note 93, at 1555-56 (citing Judith S. Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, The Long-
Term Impact of Divorce on Children: A First Report from a 25-Year Study, Presentation at the Second World
Congress of Family Law and the Rights of Children and Youth in San Francisco, California (June 2-7, 1997),
whose study sample included face-to-face interviews with 130 children and both parents, involving families
from well-educated, middle-class Northern California homes).
97 See 1997 La. Acts 1380 (amending LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 102 & 103 (West 1999), LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:234, 9:245 (West 2000), and adding LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:224(C), 9:225(A)(3), 9:272
to 9:275 and 9:307 to 9:309 (West 2000)).
98 See Spaht, supra note 91, at 1565; Wardle, Divorce Reform, supra note 90, at 787-88. Professor
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looked to marriage education classes prior to and during marriage to help parents
gain skills that will help them succeed in marriage.9'
Other reformers have focused on the damage inflicted by the divorce
process. They point out that the negative effects of divorce often are not great, and
the detrimental effects of divorce are neither inevitable nor irreparable. 1' 0 Three
factors appear to be very important to children's post-divorce adjustment: first, the
level of parental conflict; second, the degree of economic hardship after the
divorce; and third, the quality of parenting by both parents after divorce.0 1
Researchers agree that parental conflict often associated with divorce has a
particularly harmful effect on children. 2 Parents who maintain high levels of
conflict may be responsible for higher levels of anxiety and poor school
performance among their children.13 When parental conflict is minimized, there
are fewer differences between children from intact families as compared to those
with divorced parents."0
Children are also harmed by post-divorce economic hardship. Economic
hardship forces children to move away from familiar schools, surroundings,
friends, and family members. 1 5 Their custodial parent, usually their mother, often
must return to work or increase her work hours to earn enough money, as well as
assume complete responsibility for maintaining a home. These increased
responsibilities reduce her energy for parenting just when her children's needs
increase. Financial difficulties are responsible for a large percentage of the negative
impact of divorce on children." 6
Third, children need positive post-divorce parenting, ideally from both
parents. While the primary custodial parent's mental health and ability to maintain
positive and consistent parenting is most essential to children, the research also
suggests that children benefit from maintaining loving, consistent and supportive
Wardle provides an overview of legislative efforts in a variety of states to curtail unilateral no-fault divorce.
Wardle, Divorce Reform, supra note 90, at 786-90.
99 See PETER N. SWIsHER Er AL, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS, 6-10 (2d Ed.
1998).
100 See Amato, supra note 4. See also ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS:
DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND MEDIATION 200 (1994); Joan B. Kelly, Current Research on Children's
Postdivorce Adjustment: No Simple Answers, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 29, 31 (1993) (finding
that most children of divorce function within normal or average limits and are not as a group "disturbed")
[hereinafter Kelly, No Simple Answers].
101 See ANNA DAVIS, ET AL., MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF DIVORCE ON CHILDREN THROUGH
FAMILY-FOCUSED COURT REFORM 4-7 (1997).
102 See Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1994, at 165,
171-76; EMERY, supra note 100, at 205.
103 See John H. Grych & Frank D. Fimcham, Interventions for Children of Divorce: Toward Greater
Integration of Research andAction, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 434,441 (1992) (citation omitted).
104 See id.
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relationships with their noncustodial parent.'0 7
Some researchers advocate substantive and procedural reforms to
ameliorate the effects of divorce by implementing policies to reduce parental
conflict, enhance post-divorce economic security for children, and improve the
ability of parents to parent effectively and cooperatively after divorce. Some of the
reforms advocated include: mandatory parenting education programs, 10 8 support
groups for children, 09 mediation, 10 parenting plans, 11 expedited proceedings,
unified family court systems, 12 and provisions to improve the financial security of
children post-divorce.
13
These reforms are unlikely to help children of divorce who also find
themselves embroiled in a paternity dispute. These children are especially subject
to many of the risk factors that researchers have identified: high conflict between
the parents, economic hardship, and the potential loss of a psychological parent.
Although courts faced with paternity disputes occasionally refer to these risks, they
are rarely viewed as relevant to their decisionmaking.
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF THE MARrrAL PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY
A. The Historical Development of the Marital Presumption of Paternity
Dating back to the early 1700's, English common law provided that a child
born to a married couple was presumed to be the issue of that couple.1 14 The mother
and presumed father could only rebut that presumption by proving that the husband
107 See Amato, supra note 4, at 145-46; Kelly, No Simple Answers, supra note 100.
108 See Andrew Schepard, et al., The Push for Parent Education: Blueprints for Helping Families
Cope with Divorce, 19 FAM. ADVOCATE 52 (1997).
109 See, e.g., Neil Kalter, et al., School Based Developmental Facilitation Groups for Children of
Divorce: A Preventative Intervention, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 613 (1984).
110 See Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research: Some Answers and Questions, 34
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 373 (1996); Sanford N. Katz, Historical Perspective and Current Trends in
the Legal Process of Divorce, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1994, at 46, 53-55.
ill See DAVIS, ElT AL., supra note 101 , at 28; Robert Tompkins, Parenting Plans: A Concept Whose
Time Has Come, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. Rev. 286 (1995).
112 Under any assignment scheme, all judges who hear family law cases should receive ongoing
education concerning the applicable law and child development concepts. Curriculum should include
discussion of such issues as separation anxiety, continuity in relationships, and children's needs during and
after divorce. This education is especially important because of the wide discretion judges are given in
fashioning custody orders. See Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 121, 136 (Spring 1994).
113 See June Carbone, A Feminist Perspective on Divorce, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 183, 194-96
(Spring 1994). See also Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2227, 2257 (1994) (explaining that income-equalization reflects the "dominant family ecology," which
suggests income of the family is jointly owned).
114 See JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 97(96) (1913). See also,
Casenote, The "Lord Mansfield Rule" as to "Bastardizing the Issue," 3 MD. L. REV. 79, 81 (1938)
[hereinafter The "Lord Mansfield Rule"].
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did not have access to his wife during the crucial period of conception."' The rules
governing the admission of this evidence, however, were very strict. The husband
had to prove total lack of access to his wife by demonstrating that he was "extra
quatuor maria," beyond the seas, otherwise he would be presumed to be the child's
father.' 16 The varied goals advanced in support of the marital presumption and its
strict application were to preserve family integrity and inheritance rights, protect
against bastardy, and to help "local officials guard their purses."'117 If the marital
presumption of paternity was successfully rebutted, the results were devastating:
the child was declared a bastard, no longer entitled to support or inheritance from
anyone.
1 18
Early ca~es allowed wives to testify to non-access in illegitimacy cases
without corroboration.1 ' Beginning with the 1734 decision in Rex v. Reading,
English courts required the wife's testimony regarding non-access by her husband
to be corroborated by others.' Spousal testimony came to an end in 1777 when
Lord Mansfield, in Goodright v. Moss, prohibited either spouse from testifying to
non-access.121 Lord Mansfield's Rule, as it came to be called, was widely followed
because it 9upported the general public policy concerns of the time.1 22
These concerns appear to have focused not on the needs of individual
children, but on society's need for stability and certainty in family relationships at a
time when property, and therefore often a family's livelihood, was dependent on
clear rules concerning patrilineal descent.123 Even with these strict evidentiary
rules, however, some men managed to prohibit their property from passing to their
wives' illegitimate children. Lord Mansfield's Rule did not prevent others, such as
115 See The "Lord Mansfield Rule," supra note 114, at 81.
116 According to Lord Blackstone, "as if the husband be out of the kingdom of England, or, as the law
somewhat loosely phrases it, extra quatuor maria, for above nine months, so that no access to his wife can be
presumed, her issue during that period shall be bastards." 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 457 (Lewis ed.
1814). See also"The Lord Mansfield Rule," supra note 114, at 81.
117 MIcHAEL GROSSBERG; GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 202 (1985)
118 See id. at 197.
119 See Lloyd J. Planert, Note, Proof of Illegitimacy in Paternity Proceedings, 25 MARQ. L. REV. 148,
149 (1941) [hereinafter Proof of Illegitimacy].
120 Rex v. Reading, 94 Eng. Rep. 1113 (1734), Rex v. Bedel, 95 Eng. Rep. 245 (1737), and Rex v.
Luffe, 101 Eng. Rep. 316 (1807), were the earliest cases in which courts admitted the wife's testimony in
filiation cases but refused to sustain a verdict based solely on that testimony. Comment, The Admissibility of a
Parent's Testimony as to Non-Access to Prove Illegitimacy, 73 U. PA. L. REV. 71 (1924) [hereinafter The
Admissibility of a Parent's Testimony]; see also The "Lord Mansfield Rule," supra note 114, at 81.
121 See Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
122 See The "Lord Mansfield Rule," supra note 114, at 85.
123 See Harry Willekens, Long Term Developments in Family Law in Western Europe: An
Explanation, in THE CHANGING FAMILY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN FAMILY LAW at 52-3 (eds. John
Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo, 1998).
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the husband's family and friends, from testifying to the husband's lack of access.
124
So even when the evidentiary rules were at their strictest, the marital presumption
of paternity was not completely irrebuttable and did not always prevent the
destabilization of family relationships.
Beginning in the early 1800's, U.S. courts accepted Lord Mansfield's
Rule.125  It was analogous to the privilege extended to "confidential
communications" between a husbhnd and wife. 126  The "confidential
communications" rule prohibited husbands and wives from testifying as to what
went on during their marriage. 127 U.S. courts applied the rule to divorce cases if the
testimony could bastardize children born during the marriage. 128 In general, the
courts asserted that the strict evidentiary rule protected children from becoming
bastardized and prevented the immoral conduct of the parents from being
revealed.
129
By the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, U.S.
courts abandoned the "confidential communications" doctrine and began to allow
testimony of non-access as long as it did not "bastardize the issue."' 30 This
effectively limited the applicability of Lord Mansfield's Rule to bastardy cases.' 3'
For example, evidence of non-access could be admitted to prove adultery as the
legal basis for obtaining a divorce but could not be used in a proceeding to
bastardize the child.' 32
There were, however, many other ways to gain admission of evidence that
would bastardize a child. As an English court noted in Hargrave v. Hargrave, this
could be done by proving that the husband was
124 See Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist Interpretation of the Law and Legitimacy, 1998 J. WOMEN
& L. 195, 196.
125 See Commonwealth v. Stricker, Browne Appendix at 47 (Pa. 1801) (first U.S. case citing and
approving Lord Mansfield's Rule); Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige Ch. 139 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Canton v. Bentley, 11
Mass 441,442 (1841); Corson v. Corson, 44 N.H. 587, 587 (1863); Scanlon v. Walshe, 31 A. 498, 500 (Md.
1895). See also Proof of Illegitimacy, supra note 119, at 150; The Admissibility of a Parent's Testimony,
supra note 120, at 72.
126 See The "Lord Mansfield Rule, " supra note 114, at 82.
127 See id. at 83.
128 See id.
129 In Tioga County v. South Creek, 75 Pa. 433, 437 (1874), the Court stated,
[miany reasons have been given for this rule. Prominent among them is the idea that the
admission of such testimony would be unseemly and scandalous; and this, not so much
from the fact that it reveals immoral conduct upon the part of the parents, as because of
the effect it may have upon the child, who is in no fault, but who must nevertheless be the
chief sufferer thereby. That the parents should be permitted to bastardize the child is a
proposition which shocks our sense of right and decency ....
130 The "Lord Mansfield Rule, " supra note 114, at 83.
131 See id. at 84.
132 See Koffman v. Koffman, 79 N.E. 780 (111. 1907).
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(1) incompetent, (2) entirely absent, so as to have no intercourse or
communication of any kind with mother, (3) entirely absent at the
beginning of the period during which the child must, in the course
of nature, have been begotten, or (4) only present under such
circumstances as to afford clear and satisfactory proof that there
was no sexual intercourse."
The only evidence, therefore, which was inadmissible by either spouse was their
own testimony of non-access.134
Lord Wigmore issued a scathing condemnation of Lord Mansfield's rule in
the late nineteenth century.las He noted that if "decency" was the primary policy
concern, it was inconsistent to permit a wife to testify to adultery but deny her
permission to testify to non-access." 6 Furthermore, courts had undermined the
rationale that the husband's or wife's testimony of non-access should not be
admitted for fear of bastardizing the issue by permitting bastardization through
other evidentiary means. 37 He argued that all pertinent facts should be admitted
into evidence.las In the early 1900's, many states limited or abrogated Lord
Mansfield's Rule, most likely based on Wigiore's condemnation.13 9 Most states
maintained a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy through statutes or common
law.1 40 Evidence of non-access, adultery, impotence, and sterility were all
admissible to rebut the presumption.1 4' Despite these common law bases for
rebuttal, the marital presumption prevailed in all but a very limited set of
circumstances through the first half of the twentieth century.
1 42
133 50 Eng. Rep. 546 (1846); The "Lord Mansfield Rule, " supra note 114, at 85.
134 See The "Lord Mansfield Rule," supra note 114, at 85.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 85-86.
137 See id. at 86.
138 See id. at 85-86; GROSSBERG, supra note 117, at 220.
139 See The "Lord Mansfield Rule," supra note 114, at 86; GROSSBERG, supra note 117, at 221;
Blumberg, Disputed Parentage, supra note 56, at 1603.
140 Blumberg, Disputed Parentage, supra note 56, at 1603. For example, the Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Vermont, and West Virginia legislatures adopted a rebuttable presumption, while
Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia maintain a common law rebuttable presumption. Some
states established a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy when they adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. See
id.
141 See id.
142 One important subset of cases in which the marital presumption did not prevail is when married
white women gave birth to a child with African-American features. Courts refused to legitimate the African-
American children of presumed white fathers, thus conferring upon them not only their support and
inheritance rights, but also their racial status. See Fellows, supra note 124, at 500, 510.
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B. Evolving Treatment of the Marital Presumption of Paternity
As a result of the convergence of an increased focus on obtaining child
support for nonmarital children, high divorce rate, and technologic prowess in
identifying biological fathers, recent years have seen numerous challenges to and
defenses of the marital presumption of paternity. These challenges to the marital
presumption of paternity arise in many ways. Either the mother or the presumed
marital father may challenge the presumption during or after divorce, regardless of
the ages of the children. Putative biological fathers may assert their claims at any
time, either with or without the mother's agreement. State welfare agencies may
bring claims when mothers seek financial assistance for themselves and their
children.
Like the human circumstances to which they respond, the recent legal
doctrines that have emerged from challenges to the marital presumption of
paternity are complex and confusing. This doctrinal chaos manifests itself through
the dramatically different substantive and procedural law applied to challenges to
the marital presumption of paternity in different states. Outcomes to such
challenges vary greatly based on who brings the action, the timing of that action,
and in many states, highly discretionary and fact sensitive determinations by the
courts.
Although the UPA (1973) was primarily designed to ensure the accurate
identification of the fathers of children born outside of wedlock, it also contained
provisions that affected the paternity of children born to married mothers. Nineteen
states have adopted these provisions in whole or in part.143 Many other state
legislatures have passed legislation that, although again primarily focused on the
needs of nonmarital children, addresses the paternity of children born to married
mothers. Despite these many state statutes, the outcome of challenges to the marital
presumption of paternity often turns on the judicial application or rejection of
traditional judicial doctrines such as equitable estoppel, collateral estoppel, and
laches. The doctrinal chaos is deepened by the widely varying interpretations given
to these traditional judicial doctrines in different states.
This section begins with an overview of the treatment of the marital
presumption of paternity in the UPA (1973) and the recently adopted UPA (2000).
It then highlights a few of the many different family situations in which the marital
presumption of paternity is involved. It outlines the labyrinthine doctrine in this
area, including the tension the courts experience among the various parties'
interests in the compelling factual situations they face involving children who were
ostensibly born into marriage. The section ends with an exploration and critique of
the assumptions courts invoke to resolve the often heart-rending conflicts that come
before them.
1. Uniform Parentage Act of 1973
Although the drafters of the UPA (1973) focused on the rights of children
born to unmarried parents, the UPA (1973) has also had a tremendous effect on the
143 See UPA (1973), supra note 13, at 8.
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rights of children born to married persons. The UPA (1973) permitted the child, the
natural mother, and men who are presumed to be the father through marriage to the
mother to bring actions to declare the existence or non-existence of the father and
child relationship.' 44 While actions to declare the existence of the father and child
relationship could be brought by those parties at any time, actions to declare the
non-existence of the father and child relationship were limited to a reasonable
period of time "after obtaining knowledge of the relevant facts" and no later than
five years following the birth of the child.145 The choice of a five year period was
not explained in the document, and the designation of five years is in brackets,
indicating some lack of agreement about that time period.
146
Notably, the UPA (1973) did not permit men who were not presumed
fathers through marriage to bring paternity actions to assert their parental rights to
children born during the mother's marriage.' 47 Broad rights of any "interested
persons" to bring such actions were limited to actions concerning children for
whom there was no presumed father or where the presumption was based on the
conduct of an unmarried father.
148
The UPA (1973) permitted actions to declare the non-existence of
paternity in presumed marital fathers, but it did not specify what kind of evidence
was adequate to rebut the presumption. Traditionally, of course, the presumption
could be rebutted only by evidence that the husband could not be the father due to
lack of access to the mother, and many courts had added sterility or impotence as
other grounds on which the presumption could be rebutted.'49 Instead of defining
what kind of evidence would rebut the presumption, the UPA (1973) merely stated
that the presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and that if
two presumptions came into conflict with each other, courts should base their
decisions on the presumption that "on the facts is founded on the weightier
considerations of policy and logic." 150 The UPA (1973) did not include a
presumption based on the results of genetic testing. 51 It did state that evidence
relating to paternity "may include: ... blood tests results, weighted in accordance
with evidence, if available, of the statistical probability of the alleged father's
paternity. ' 152 Because this broad language gave no substance to the rebuttalstandards, there has been no uniformity in the application of those rebuttal
144 See id. §6.
145 See id.
146 See id. § 6(c).
147 See id. § 6(a).
148 See UPA (1973), supra note 13, § 6(b).
149 KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY, supra note 36, at 16-17.
150 UPA (1973), supra note 13, § 4(b).
151 d § 4.
152 Id. § 12(3).
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standards even among the states that adopted the UPA (1973). s3
The circumstances in which the marital presumption of paternity can be
successfully rebutted varies dramatically state by state and by factors such as the
identity of the party who brings the action, the timing of the action, the marital
status of the mother and the presumed father, and the specific promises made or
actions taken by the presumed father or alleged unmarried biological father. Courts
with similar statutes have reached dramatically different conclusions about the
circumstances in which rebuttal of the marital presumption of paternity is
appropriate.' 5 4
Central to these differences is the question of the role of genetic testing. In
most states, scientific evidence of paternity creates a presumption of paternity. 155 In
some states scientific evidence of paternity or nonpaternity creates a conclusive
presumption. 56 In those states that do not treat the results of genetic testing as a
conclusive presumption, courts must determine whether the results of the genetic
testing are, by themselves, sufficient to rebut the marital presumption or if other
factors, such as equitable estoppel or the best interests of the child, prevent the
rebuttal of the marital presumption. These judicial decisions concerning whether
genetic test results are sufficient to rebut the marital presumption of paternity
appear to be based on assumptions about fatherhood. Courts rely on these briefly
stated assumptions with little or no evidentiary support or analysis.
157
2. Uniform Parentage Act of 2000
Unfortunately, the drafters of the newly revised UPA (2000) have not
adequately tackled these thorny and deeply divisive issues.158 The Prefatory Note to
an earlier draft of the revision stated that the new draft was designed to focus on
"protecting the child, who had no voice in often complex circumstances giving rise
to the child's birth."' 159 However, at least for children for whom the marital
153 Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-6-3(1) (Michie 1997) (testing results and findings of the expert
generally constitute conclusive evidence if the results and findings exclude a party as the biological father of
the child); with CAL. FAM. CODE § 7554(b) (Deering 1996) (if experts disagree in their findings or
conclusions, or if the tests show the probability of the alleged father's paternity, the question shall be
submitted upon all the evidence, including evidence based upon the tests.); and NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
1415(2) (1998) (testing results, whether or not such tests were ordered, that show a probability of 99% or
more, create a rebuttable presumption of paternity).
154 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
155 See Litovsky & Schultz, supra note 78, at 85-86. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-
105(l)(f) (West Supp. 1999); OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.03(A)(5) (West Supp. 1999)
156 In 1998, Litovsky & Schultz reported that twenty-two states set a scientific standard for a
conclusive presumption of nonpaternity, while only eight established a scientific standard for a conclusive
presumption of paternity. See Litovsky & Schultz, supra note 78, at 85-86.
157 See discussion infra Part V.
158 See UPA (2000), supra note 35.
159 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proposed Revision of the
Uniform Parentage Act (October, 1999) (visited January 9, 2001), <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
blIulc/upa/upal099.htm> [hereinafter 1999 Proposed Revision of the UPA].
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presumption of paternity comes into dispute, the UPA (2000), which predominantly
relies on the UPA (1973), fails to create certainty or consistency among the states.
The UPA (2000) both increases and decreases the disparity of treatment
between married and unmarried fathers. Although married fathers continue to
maintain their presumption of paternity, unmarried fathers are recognized only in
two ways: through written acknowledgment of their paternity or through legal
action against them or initiated by them to require genetic testing and a judicial
finding of paternity.160 Thus, unmarried fathers who behave similarly to married
fathers by accepting children into their home and holding them out as their natural
children are no longer presumed fathers, nor are there any time limitations on
attacks on their paternal status.16' However, unlike the UPA (1973), an alleged
biological father of a child born to a married mother now has standing to bring an
action to determine the existence or non-existence of the parent-child
relationship.1 62 Thus, a developed parent-child relationship between an unmarried
father and his child receives no deference, but unmarried fathers are permitted to
assert their parentage claims concerning children born to married mothers. 63
The proposed draft removes the necessity of joining the child as a party."
Although this change was made to reflect the drafters' view of widespread
practice, 16  it leaves the interests of children, whose paternity is at stake,
unrepresented in these important proceedings. 66 Many courts have recognized the
necessity of a legal advocate for the child where parents who are battling each other
may not be focused on the best interests of the child whose paternity is the subject
of the action.167
In limiting the timing for actions to rebut the marital presumption of
paternity, the UPA (2000) follows the lead of a small number of states. It limits
actions to rebut the marital presumption to two years following the birth of the
child if the presumed father lived in the same household as the child or treated the
160 See UPA (2000), supra note 35, § 204 (eliminating presumptions based on a man's receiving a
child into his home and openly holding out the child as his natural child).
161 See id. § 606.
162 See id. § 602(3).
163 These claims are, however, limited to the two years following the birth of the child. See Ud § 607.
164 See id. § 603.
165 See 1999 Proposed Revision of the UPA, supra note 159, § 603 cmt.
166 See UPA (2000), supra note 35, § 612. This section provides that a minor child is a permissible,
although not necessary party, and that if the child is a party, or if the court finds that the interests of the minor
child are not adequately represented, the court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the child. See
id.
167 See e.g., Harris v. Harris, 753 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (requiring trial court to obtain
a guardian ad litem for the child prior to termination of all visitation rights of the reputed father under a
settlement agreement that acknowledges a lack of paternity); In the Matter of the Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d
331, 336 (Kan. 1989)(guardian ad litem should conduct independent investigation in order to properly
represent the best interests of the child); M. F. v. N.H., 599 A.2d 1297, 1302 (NJ. Super. 1991)(appointment
of guardian ad litme is likely to be required to assist court in determining the best interests of the child).
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child as his own. 168 Although the UPA (2000) limits the amount of time for certain
challenges to the presumption, there is no clear explanation for the choice of a two
year period of time. The reporter's notes to a 1999 draft state that the two-year
period "allows an adequate period to resolve the status of a child within the context
of an intact family unit; a longer period may have severe consequences for the
child.' 169 No evidentiary base is provided for the assumption that actions
commenced at two years (and probably decided well after the child's second
birthday) will not have severe consequences for children. It is also unclear why a
later change of paternity will harm a child if the child's "father" was married to the
mother, but will not create the same harm for a child if the "father" was not
married to but cohabited with the child's mother.
The UPA (2000) does not clearly resolve the question of paternity in a
contest between a biological father and a husband in an action brought within two
years of the child's birth. In actions to adjudicate a husband's paternity, the court
may deny a request for genetic testing if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the conduct of the mother or the presumed father estops that party from
denying parentage and it would be inequitable to disestablish the father-child
relationship.'70 In making that determination, the court must consider the best
interests of the child. 171 Once the court determines that genetic testing is proper,
however, the court must adjudicate the genetic father as the legal father of the
child. 172 If the action is brought more than two years after the birth of the child, the
presumed father's paternity can no longer be contested by anyone, including the
presumed father.173 Given the dramatic differences in judicial interpretations of
equitable estoppel, equity, and best interests of the child by the different state
courts, this provision is unlikely to create uniformity in the judicial resolution of
168 UPA (2000), supra note 35, § 605. Oklahoma has adopted a similar statute that refuses to permit
any challenges to the marital presumption of paternity "if a child is born during the course of the marriage
and is reared by the husband and wife as a member of their family without disputing the child's legitimacy for
a period of at least two years." OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 3(B) (2000). California has also adopted a two year
limitation on actions to disestablish the paternity of a presumed father. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West
2000).
169 1999 Proposed Revision of the UPA, supra note 159, § 605 Cmt.
170 See UPA (2000), supra note 35, § 608. Section 608 states in part:
(a) In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage under circumstances described in Section
607, a court may deny genetic testing of the mother, the child, and the presumed father
if the court determines that:
(1) the conduct of the mother or the presumed father estops that party from denying
parentage; and
(2) it would be inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship between the child
and the presumed father.
(b) In determining whether to deny genetic testing under this section, the court shall
consider the best interest of the child ....
171 See id. § 608(b).
172 See id. § 631(2).
173 See id. § 607. The time constraint does not apply if: (1) the presumed father and the mother of the
child did not cohabit or engage in sexual intercourse during the probable time of conception; and (2) the
presumed father never openly treated the child as his own. See id. § 607(b).
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challenges to the paternity of presumed fathers.
C. Challenges to the Marital Presumption of Paternity
Although it is impossible to delineate the wide range of family situations in
which the marital presumption of paternity is at issue, three scenarios recur, all
involving the legal paternity of the presumed father who was married to the child's
mother. These three situations include: (1) where an alleged biological father
asserts paternity rights over a child whose mother and presumed father are married
to each other; (2) where a husband or ex-husband denies paternity during or
following a divorce from the mother; and (3) where a mother denies the paternity
of her husband or ex-husband during or following a divorce. The facts of three
cases, as set forth in the judicial opinions, are described below. Each case
description is followed by a discussion of the statutory and case law and judicial
doctrines that have been developed in response to each scenario.
1. Alleged Biological Father Asserts Paternity Rights: Rodney F. v.
Karen M.
Karen M. and her husband were married in 1985 and, in 1998, still lived
together as husband and wife.174 The marriage had problems, and twice Karen filed
for divorce, although they never obtained a divorce.' 75 From May of 1991 through
July of 1992, Karen was involved in an affair with her co-worker, Rodney F.
176
During that time, Rodney and Karen rented two different apartments to use as
meeting places. 177 Because Karen's husband frequently spent a week at a time
offshore for the oil industry, Karen spent a considerable amount of time with
Rodney in those residences. 78
Karen continued to have sexual intercourse with her husband throughout
her relationship with Rodney. 79 Karen became pregnant at the end of July, 1992.180
In September of that year, she told her husband about the affair with Rodney and
about the pregnancy. 81 Her husband was unaware of the affair until that time.'
18 2
She also told Rodney about her pregnancy that month and reported that he





179 See Rodney F., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
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expressed little interest in the pregnancy.' 83 A baby girl was born in March,
1993.'84 She lived exclusively with Karen and her husband.18 The child had no
contact with Rodney F.186 He however filed an action to establish his paternity and
obtain joint legal and physical custody of the newborn.
187
Rodney requested blood tests, which showed that there was a 99.5 percent
probability that Rodney was the biological father. 1 8 Based on this evidence and his
testimony about his sexual relationship with Karen during the period of conception,
Rodney asked the court to recognize his paternity of the child and grant him
visitation with his biological daughter.1 89
The California courts dismissed Rodney F.'s claims for paternity and
visitation.' 90 In California, as in many states that adopted the UPA (1973), alleged
biological fathers may not bring paternity actions when the child has a legal father
through the marital presumption of paternity.'91 Some states have permitted such
actions only when the alleged biological father can prove the traditional criteria for
disturbing a husband's paternity: evidence of impotence, imbecility, or absence
from the wife's presence during the period of conception.'
92
Statutes that prohibit alleged biological fathers from asserting paternity
when the mother remains married to her husband, who is presumed to be the father,
have been subject to challenge by putative biological fathers as denials of their
equal protection and due process rights.193 The United States Supreme Court, in a
plurality decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,94 found that California's refusal to
permit putative fathers to contest the paternity of children born during their
mother's marriage to another did not violate the Due Process Clause of the
183 See id.




188 See id. at 404.
189 See Rodney F., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401.
190 See id. at 401, 404-405.
191 See id. at 401. Other states have found the presumption irrrebuttable under common law, in the
absence of any clear statutory law governing the situation. See, e.g., Amrhein v. Cozad, 714 A.2d 409 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (refusing to permit alleged biological father to rebut presumption because mother and
husband are still married). Other states have excluded alleged biological fathers by statute, see, e.g., S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-8-57 (Michie 1999) (limiting parties who may dispute presumption of legitimacy of
child born in wedlock to husband or wife or a descendent of one or both of them).
192 See Chandler v. Merrell, 353 S.E.2d 133 (S.C. 1987) (refusing to find that the marital presumption
was rebutted in the absence of proof of one of these limited circumstances even though the mother and
husband had died in an accident shortly after the birth of the child and the alleged biological father was
seeking to intervene in adoption proceeding for the orphaned child).
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Fourteenth Amendment. 95 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, found that an
unmarried father's right to assert paternity over a child born to a married woman
was not sufficiently deeply embedded in our cultural traditions to establish it as a
fundamental right.196
State courts have split on the issue of the asserted constitutional right of
putative fathers to assert their paternity of children born to married mothers. Some
state courts have followed the Michael H. decision and have found that the
exclusion of putative fathers from those permitted to assert paternity does not
violate due process or equal protection under either the federal or state
constitutions. 197 Others have found quite the opposite-that denying standing to
alleged biological fathers to assert paternity did violate either the due process or
equal protection provisions of their state constitutions.1 98 For example, the Iowa
Supreme Court explicitly rejected Justice Scalia's reasoning that the rights of an
unmarried father to assert paternity over a child born during the mother's marriage
was not sufficiently established in our cultural traditions to create a fundamental
right.199 The Iowa Supreme Court found that the definition of a protected liberty
interest under the Iowa Due Process Clause "recognizes the changing nature of
society.
200
Many other states have adopted statutes that permit men alleging
themselves to be the biological fathers of marital children to bring actions to
establish their paternity.2"' In some instances, courts have followed these statutes
195 Id. at 119.
196 See id. at 125.
197 See, e.g., Dawn D. v. Superior Ct., 952 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Cal. 1998); Hauser v. Reilly, 536
N.W.2d 865, 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Market v. Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239, 243-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
Merkel v. Doe, 635 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1993); Amrhein v. Cozad, 714 A.2d 409, 414 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998); Evans v. Steelman, 970 S.W.2d 431,434-35 (Tenn. 1998); A v. X, Y & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1223-24
(Wyo. 1982).
198 See R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980) (finding that denial of standing to putative father
violated Equal Protection Clause of Colorado Constitution); Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa
1999) (determining that denial of standing to putative father violated due process rights under state
constitution); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994) (ruling that statute denying putative father standing
to challenge paternity violated due process clause of state constitution i superseded by statute in TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.101(a)(3) (West 1996)); State of West Virginia ex rel Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d
554 (W. Va. 1996) (holding that biological father who has developed substantial relationship with child gains
liberty interest in father-child relationship that is protected by the due process clause of the West Virginia
constitution). But see Merkel v. Doe, 635 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1993) (finding that state statute that
permits putative fathers to assert their paternity of a child who was born during the mother's marriage and was
being raised by the mother and her husband violates the mother and husband's fundamental interests in the
privacy and integrity of their family relationships). Another Ohio Court declined to follow the Merkel court's
interpretation. See Patrick T. v. Michelle L., 2000 WL 1752792 (Ohio App. Nov. 30,2000).
199 See Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999).
200 Id. at 190.
201 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-104(a) (Michie 1987) (providing that any man alleging to be
the father of an illegitimate child may petition the county court for a determination of the paternity of the
illegitimate child); IOWA CODE § 60013.8 (1996) (authorizing paternity actions to be brought by the mother, or
other interested person); IND. CODE § 31-14-4-1 (1999) (authorizing "[a] man alleging that he is the child's
biological father or that he is the expectant father of an unborn child" to file a paternity action); MIss. CODE
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and permitted alleged biological fathers to successfully assert their paternity based
on the results of genetic testing. 0 2 However, other states' courts have adopted a
variety of doctrines that either prevent successful paternity claims by alleged
biological fathers or at the least erect additional barriers to their success.
For example, state law in Arizona permits paternity actions to be brought
by the mother or father, or on behalf of a child born out of wedlock.20 3 It allows the
marital presumption of paternity to be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
and lists genetic testing which affirms at least a ninety-five percent probability of
paternity as another source of a paternity presumption.204 The legislation also
provides that courts shall order genetic testing in paternity actions on the motion of
one of the parties. 05 This legislation would appear to make paternity rulings, even
those involving the marital presumption of paternity, dependent on the results of
genetic testing.
Despite this apparently clear statutory mandate, Arizona courts have
determined that although state law gives alleged biological fathers standing to
assert their paternity when the mother and her husband are still married, they may
obtain genetic testing only if the court first determines that a decision in favor of
the alleged biological father's paternity would be in the best interests of the
child.20 6 The Arizona court added the best interests analysis in the absence of any
statutory language directing it to include such a determination in a paternity
proceeding.
A similar approach was adopted by a New Jersey court. State law provides
that a plaintiff who alleges himself to be the father has standing to bring an action
"for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and
child relationship., 20 7 It also provides that, upon the motion of a party in a
ANN.§ 93-9-21 (1999) (requiring court to order paternity testing on motion of alleged biological father).
202 See, e.g., Willmon v. Hunter, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ark. 1988) (finding that statute permits man
alleging to be biological father of child with presumed father to assert paternity and that such an action does
not violate any public policy of the state); Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 812 P.2d 1216, 1219-20 (Idaho 1991)
(finding that statute permits alleged biological father to bring action); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.
1996) (determining that statute permits alleged biological father to bring paternity action despite intact
marriage of mother and presumed father); Rafferty v. Perkins, 757 So. 2d 992, 995-96 (Miss. 2000)
(determining that results of scientific paternity testing adequate to overcome marital presumption).
203 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-806(A) & (B) (West 2000).
204 See id. § 25-814(A)(1) & (2).
205 See id. § 25-807(C).
206 See Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014, 1018 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 817 P.2d 37,41
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). See also, In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 336 (Kan. 1989) (determining that
duty of guardian ad litem is to make an independent investigation of the facts upon which the paternity
petition is based and then to appear and represent the best interest of the child at the hearing); Turner v.
Whisted, 607 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. 1992) (finding that alleged biological father should bring action under
Estates and Trusts Article which gives court discretion to grant or deny request for blood tests based on the
best interest of the child); In re the Paternity of "Adam", 903 P.2d 207, 211 (Mont. 1995) (adopting best
interest of the child standard for deciding whether biological father should be recognized as legal father under
Montana's UPA); In re Paternity of C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d 719, 728 (Wis. 1991) (holding that determination
of best interest of the children must be made considering all factors which weigh upon the children's interest).
207 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-45 (West 1999).
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contested case, the court "shall" order "the child, mother and alleged father to
submit to blood tests or genetic tests., 20 8 Nevertheless, the New Jersey court found
that "an action does not rise to the level of a 'contested case' until it has been
judicially so designated. 20 9 Thus, while the alleged biological father had standing
to file a complaint, that standing "does not ensure that the action may proceed and
that blood tests may be ordered., 210 Like the Arizona court, the New Jersey court
refused to order genetic testing until the alleged biological father proved that
"establishment of [his] paternity and the rebuttal of the husband's paternity will
serve the best interests of the child.",
211
In contrast, other state courts have developed doctrines to permit alleged
biological fathers to assert paternity of children born during the mother's marriage
despite explicit statutory provisions that forbid such actions. In Massachusetts,
although state law forbids a man who is not married to the mother to petition for
paternity "under this chapter" when the child was born during or within 300 days
of the mother's marriage to another, the Supreme Judicial Court found that courts
could hear such a petition under their equity jurisdiction.212 The court determined
that paternity actions could be brought by putative biological fathers who had
developed a substantial relationship with their children.213 Connecticut courts have
also permitted actions by alleged biological fathers despite the absence of any
statutory basis.214 Instead of this "developed relationship" test, Connecticut courts
"weigh the multiplicity of competing interests that may hang in the balance" prior
to determining whether an alleged biological father may proceed with a paternity
215action.
Thus, state courts have moved in both directions: in some cases, they have
limited the reach of state laws that permit alleged biological fathers to pursue
paternity actions; other state courts have created a common law right to bring such
208 Id. § 9:17-48.
209 M.F. v. N.H., 599 A.2d 1297, 1299 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
210 Id. at 1300.
211 Id. The Arizona and New Jersey courts are not the only courts to create a best interests standard
that is not contained in the state statutory law. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987).
212 C.C. v. A,B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Mass. 1990).
213 See id. at 372-73. The court left for another day the issue of what rights a putative father might
have in a case where the mother has prevented him from developing a substantial relationship with the child.
See id. at 373. Similarly, Florida courts have found that although state paternity law prevents alleged
biological fathers from bringing paternity actions, men who have developed a substantial relationship with a
child have standing to bring paternity actions. See Kendrick v Everheart, 290 So. 2d 53, 61 (Fla. 1980). The
West Virginia Supreme Court has applied the "developed relationship" test in the context of identifying
whether the putative father has a liberty interest in his relationship with the child. State of West Virginia ex
rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554,565-566 (W. Va. 1996).
214 The Connecticut Supreme Court found that although the state statute on paternity actions did not
permit actions by alleged biological fathers when the child was born in wedlock, alleged biological fathers
nevertheless retain the right to pursue an adjudication of paternity under a habeas corpus action brought under
the court's equity jurisdiction. See Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 661 A.2d 988, 996 (Conn. 1995).
215 Ia at 1000.
.2000]
29
Glennon: Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumpti
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
actions despite the apparent rejection of such actions by the legislature. In both of
the situations described here, however, alleged biological fathers could obtain an
order for genetic testing only after showing either: (1) a finding of paternity in
favor of the alleged biological father would be in the best interests of the child; (2)
the alleged biological father had already developed a substantial relationship with
the child; or (3) the overall balancing of the applicable interests demonstrates that it
is better to recognize the alleged biological father's paternity.
Other courts have determined that the best interests of the child analysis
should follow rather than precede the results of the genetic testing. For example, a
Minnesota court was faced with a paternity challenge in which the alleged
biological father's probability of paternity was greater than ninety-nine percent.216
This placed the marital presumption in conflict with a second presumption listed in
the controlling statute, a presumption based on the results of genetic testing.217 The
statute, which was patterned on the UPA (1973), directed the court to resolve these
conflicts by applying the presumption that "is founded on the weightier
considerations of policy and logic. ' 218 The court chose to employ the best interests
of the child analysis in order to determine which of the presumptions should control
in this instance.219
Judicial discretion to decide whether to order genetic testing when alleged
biological fathers assert their paternity over a child born to a married mother is
expressly granted by some state statutes. 220 For example, when any party in
Wisconsin argues that establishing the paternity of the putative biological father is
not in the best interests of the child, the court must make a judicial determination of
the child's best interest.221 If the court finds that such a paternity determination is
not in the child's interest, it must refuse to order genetic testing. 2
Timing may also affect the right of an alleged biological father to assert
paternity. New York courts have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
prevent a putative father from challenging an ex-husband's paternity. In Ettore L v.
Angela D.,2 the court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a
biological father who filed a paternity action when the child was almost three even
though he knew he was the biological father since the child's birth. 224 Oklahoma
216 See In re the Paternity of B.J.H., 573 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
217 See id. at 103.
218 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55(2) (West 1998).
219 See In re the Paternity of B.J.H., 573 N.W.2d at 99-101 (affirming the trial court's grant of
paternity to the putative father as in the best interests of the child).
220 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.458(lm) (West 1993).
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 513 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). See also, Palmer v. Carter, 543 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989).
224 513 N.Y.S.2d at 739-40. See also In re D.B.S. by and through P.S. v. M.S., 888 P.2d 875, 885
(Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
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prohibits any action to disestablish the presumptive father's paternity after two
years if the child has lived with the mother and her husband as part of the family
during that time.2-5
One state, Louisiana, has adopted a common law concept of dual
paternity. 2 6 An alleged biological father may assert his paternity, if done in a
timely manner and proven by genetic testing.227 However, the establishment of the
alleged biological father's paternity does not disrupt the rights and responsibilities
of the legally presumed father, and the alleged biological father is only permitted
visitation with the child if he demonstrates his worthiness to participate in the
child's life. a If his participation in the child's life does not meet the best interests
of the child, the legally recognized biological father retains a support obligation but
cannot claim the privilege of parental rights.229
2. Presumed Father Denies Paternity During or Following Divorce
From Mother: NPA v. WBA
WBA and NPA, husband and wife, were married in 1977.230 They had a
difficult marriage and separated for part of 1980 and 1981.231 They both had sexual
intercourse with others during their separation. Shortly after they reconciled, NPA
found out that she was pregnant.232 WBA was upset by his wife's pregnancy, and
worried that he was not the fatherYm NPA testified that she told him that if he had
any doubts about being the father he should have a blood test while she was in the
hospital.234 She also stated that she told him that if he didn't want to get a blood
test, he should never raise the issue of their child's paternity again. 23s The husband,
on the other hand, testified that NPA reassured him that he was the biological father
and that he accepted this statement as true and did not request that blood tests be
performed.23 6 After the child's birth in May 1981, NPA and WBA brought the child
home and raised him together.237 WBA always treated the child as his own
25 See David V.R. v. Wanda J.D., 907 P.2d 1025 (Okla. 1995).
226 See T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 876 (La. 1999).
227 See id. at 876-77.
2 See id. at 877.
229 See id. at 876.
230 See NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).




25 See NPA, 380 S.E.2d at 179.
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throughout the remaining years of the marriage, and the son was never told that
there was any question about his parenthood.238 A second child was born a few
years after the son's birth, and she, too, was raised by NPA and WBA together.239
In 1985, NPA filed for a divorce from WBA.240 For the first time during
the children's lifetime, WBA asserted that he was not their biological father.241 The
trial court ordered HLA testing, which established that the five-year-old son was
not WBA's biological child, while the three-year-old daughter was WBA's
biological child.242 Based on the test results and his wife's admission that she had
sexual intercourse with another man during their separation, WBA moved to
disestablish paternity of the son and to be freed of any support obligation toward
him, although maintaining his relationship with and support for his daughter.
243
Relying on the principle that a parent owes a duty of support only to his or
her natural or legally adopted child, the Virginia court found that WBA was not the
boy's father and owed him no duty of support.244 A number of other state courts
have also relied on this principle in holding that men who are presumed to be
fathers through marriage may challenge their paternity at the time of divorce.245
The most common doctrine advocated by litigants in opposition to a
husband's denial of paternity at the time of divorce is the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. Equitable estoppel generally requires that a party show: (1) conduct or
words amounting to a representation; (2) reasonable reliance; and (3) resulting
prejudice.246
Those courts that have rejected the application of equitable estoppel
against husbands who deny paternity generally focus on two aspects of equitable
estoppel doctrine. First, if the husband did not know the real facts concerning the
child's parentage, these courts may find that it would be unfair to hold the husband
to his representations of fatherhood. Second, many courts find that the child has not
been prejudiced by the husband's parenting and later withdrawal from that
parenting.
238 See id. at 182.
239 See id. at 179.
240 See NPA, 380 S.E.2d at 179.
241 See id. at 180.
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 180-81.
245 See, e.g., Gann v. Gann, 705 So. 2d 509, 510-11 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding that husband can
rebut presumption by clear and convincing evidence based on genetic testing); Smith v. Smith, 845 P.2d
1090, 1092 (Alaska 1993) (holding same as Gann v. Gann); Gantt v. Gantt, 716 So. 2d 846, 847 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998); Doe v. Roe, 859 P.2d 922, 924 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d
1131, 1134 (Il1. App. Ct. 1998) (finding that husband can dispute paternity in divorce proceedings within two
years of obtaining knowledge of relevant facts); Cooper v. Cooper, 608 N.E.2d 1386, 1389 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993) (finding that husband who supported child during marriage can dispute paternity for "good cause").
246 These standard elements of equitable estoppel were outlined by the court in B.E.B. v. R.LB., 979
P.2d 514, 516 (Alaska 1999).
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For example, in Dews v. Dews,247 the court rejected equitable estoppel in
part because the father did not know the real facts concerning the child's
conception. 248 Therefore, the court reasoned, it would be unfair to apply estoppel to
him where he did not knowingly misrepresent his parenthood to the child in
question.249 Courts have differed in their treatment of men who did know that they
were not biological fathers yet held themselves out as the child's father anyway.
Although some courts have found that letting a child call a man "daddy" and
referring to the child in public as his daughter did not constitute
misrepresentation,250 others have considered a knowing acceptance of the role of
parent one that cannot later be rejected.251
A second focus of judicial attention has been the alleged detriment to the
child. Most courts have found that acceptance of the paternal role and provision of
support during the marriage does not create reliance or detriment.252 They have
differed about both the existence and importance of emotional or financial harm to
affected children. A number of such courts find that the emotional harm that the
child experiences as a result of the husband's rejection of the child despite a
longstanding parent-child relationship does not demonstrate reliance and detriment.
Rather, these courts focus solely on financial harm, which they find arises only
when the husband affirmatively prevents the mother and child from pursuing
support from the biological father.20
Only a few states have applied equitable estoppel doctrine against
husbands who deny paternity in divorce or post-divorce actions where the husbands
did not know that they were not the biological father prior to the court action in
247 632 A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1993).
248 See iL at 1168.
249 See id.; see also, Masters v. Worlsey, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); NPA v. WBA, 380
S.E.2d 178, 182 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
250 See, e.g., K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570,573 (D.C. Ct. App. 1994).
251 See, e.g, M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 779 (NJ. 1985) (estopping presumed father who knew
he was not biological father yet represented to child and community that he was father from disclaiming his
responsibility to child); Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545, 547-48 (R.L 1994) (estopping presumed father who
knew that he was not biological father prior to marriage and promised to treat child as his own from escaping
support obligation).
252 See, e.g., In re Marriage of A.J.N. & J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting
asserted reliance or detriment based on husband's alleged promise to love and support child where mother did
not know identity of biological father).
253 See B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 919 P.2d 514, 520 (Alaska 1999) (reviewing equitable estoppel case law in
paternity disputes and determining that it will only recognize financial detriment under that doctrine); K.A.T.
v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573 (D.C. 1994) (refusing to find financial detriment solely on supposition that
possibility of locating and obtaining support from biological father is now negligible); Knill v. Knill, 510
A.2d 546, 550 (Md. 1986) (finding detrimental reliance only when non-biological parent's conduct "actively
interferes with the children's support from their natural parent"); Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (NJ.
1984) (determining that equitable estoppel requires representation of support, reliance and financial
detriment); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1985) (determining that presumed father's consent to
have name placed on birth certificate does not meet element of detriment for purposes of equitable estoppel);
In re Marrige of AJ.N. & J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting application of equitable
estoppel against husband even where financial support for child from biological father was not an option).
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which they denied paternity. 24 A larger number of states have been willing to
apply equitable estoppel where the husband knew that he was not the biological
father yet developed a loving parent-child relationship with the child anyway. s
West Virginia has chosen yet a different path: where scientific tests disprove the
husband's paternity, the court should determine whether an adjudication of
nonpaternity would harm the child prior to deciding whether to admit the scientific
evidence. 56
Washington state courts mandate that in any proceeding that could disrupt
the marital presumption of paternity, the court must determine the best interests of
the child. 7  Thus, where a presumed father is the child's psychological father and
continuation of the father-child relationship would provide the child with stability
and continuity, Washington courts are extremely reluctant to permit presumed
fathers to deny their paternity. 5 8
Issues of timing can be considered important in many different ways: in
relationship to the date of the child's birth; in relationship to the date upon which
the presumed father gained reason to believe he was not the biological father; and
in relationship to the termination of the marriage. Some states have applied strict
statutes of limitations to actions by presumed fathers to disavow paternity. For
example, Louisiana's statute bars actions more than one year after the child's
birth.259 Other states have adopted statutes of limitations of two or five years.260
The timeliness of applications to disavow paternity has also been
determined in relationship to the date the presumed father discovered that he may
254 See, e.g., Judson v. Judson, 1995 WL 476848 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 1995) (refusing to permit
husband to deny paternity of twelve and six-year-old children in divorce proceeding although unclear whether
court is applying estoppel or best interests of child); Watts v. Watts, 337 A.2d 350, 352 (N.H. 1975)
(rejecting ex-husband's effort to deny paternity after discovery that children were not his biological offspring
where had acknowledged children for fifteen years and stating that "[to] allow defendant to escape liability
for support by using blood tests would be to ignore his lengthy, voluntary acceptance of parental
responsibilities").
255 See, e.g., Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545, 548 (R.I. 1994) (denying husband's petition to
disestablish paternity upon divorce where knew child was not biological offspring, encouraged mother to
keep child, and provided love and support to child during marriage).
256 See Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 870-71 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that court should
examine factors such as duration and nature of parent-child relationship, facts surrounding discovery of
nonpatemity, and harm to child if paternity were successfully disproved, including whether passage of time
reduced chances of establishing paternity in biological father); William L. v. Cindy E.L., 495 S.E.2d 836, 839
(W. Va. 1997) (refusing to permit husband to deny paternity where had maintained father-child relationship
for four years and was on notice that might not be biological father since shortly after child's birth).
257 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wendy M., 962 P.2d 130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
258 See id. at 133-34 (denying husband's petition to disavow paternity where presumed father is
psychological parent and biological father, whom child has never seen, has been incarcerated for last six
years).
259 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (West Supp. 2001) (enforcing time limitation strictly unless the
child is born more than 300 days after the parents are legally separated).
260 Oklahoma limits actions to establish or disestablish paternity to two years where the child lived for
those two years with mother and husband as a member of family. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 3 (West
1998). Colorado provides five years. See R.E.H. v. J.M.H., 736 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
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not be the biological father. For example, Washington's statute permits presumed
fathers to bring actions to declare the nonexistence of the father and child
relationship "only if the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining
knowredge of relevant facts." 26' A few other courts have applied laches to claims
where presumed fathers had knowledge of the relevant facts yet waited many years
to bring their action to disavow paternity.6 2
Timing has also come into play in relationship to the dissolution of the
marriage. Ex-husbands have been less successful in denying paternity after a final
divorce decree has been entered than they have been while divorce proceedings are
still ongoing. Some states have permitted ex-husbands to contest their liability for
child support where the courts find that the mother committed fraud during the
divorce proceeding '-or that the husband was unaware of the child's existence at
the time of the divorce.
264
A large number of states, however, have barred ex-husbands from denying
their paternity after the divorce proceeding is final. Many courts have employed the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent later disavowals of paternity.265 Other
261 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(l)(b) (West 1997). See also In re Paternity of K., 752 P.2d
393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing trial court's rejection of presumed father's petition to declare
nonexistence of father-child relationship as untimely for failure to ascertain time at which presumed father
became aware of facts which would lead him to question his biological paternity); Bergan v. Bergan, 572
N.W.2d 272, 274-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
262 See Arvizu v. Fernandez, 902 P.2d 830, 834 (Ariz. CL App. 1995) (applying laches where
presumed father had waited twelve years and had neglected several opportunities to bring his claim to the
court's attention); In re Marriage of Boer, 559 P.2d 529, 539 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that presumed
father was barred by laches where he knew at time of child's birth that he was not biological father yet failed
to raise nonparentage as defense at divorce).
263 See, e.g., LJ. v. C.E.H., 835 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to apply five year
statute of limitation to bring action to disavow paternity to ex-husband's defense of nonpaternity to support
proceeding against him); Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 1990) (finding that equity favors
reopening of judgment where ex-husband learned of nonpaternity in test that was obtained solely for purposes
of medical treatment); Cain v. Cain, 777 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Ky. 1989) (permitting ex-husband to deny
paternity twelve years after divorce and two years after discovery that wife had fraudulently led him to
believe that he was father); Love v. Love, 959 P.2d 523, 526 (Nev. 1998) (finding that ex-husband not bound
by res judicata if can show that ex-wife fraudulently concealed child's parentage in divorce proceeding);
Hilaire v. DeBlois, 721 A.2d 133, 135 (VL 1998) (holding that ex-husband can be relieved of support
obligation if demonstrates that wife committed fraud in divorce proceedings); Batrouny v. Batrouny, 412
S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. Ct App. 1991) (finding that wife's intentional representation to divorce court that child
was born of marriage constituted fraud that permitted reopening of issue).
264 See Spears v. Spears, 784 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Ky. CL App. 1990); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d
499,502 (Utah CL App. 1989).
265 See, e.g, Benac v. State, 808 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (applying res judicata to North
Carolina divorce decree which states that child is issue of the marriage and precluding father from obtaining
tests to disprove paternity); Hotz v. Hotz, 214 Cal. Rptr. 658, 659-60 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1985) (prior default
judgment of divorce res judicata on issue of paternity); Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 502 (D.C. 1995)
(applying collateral estoppel where issue had actually been litigated in divorce proceeding); Luedtke v.
Koopsma, 303 N.W.2d 112, 114 (S.D. 1981) (applying res judicata to prior divorce decree where ex-wife did
not fraudulently prevent ex-husband from participating in prior proceeding); Sparks v. Sparks, 1989 Ky. App.
LEXIS 139 (refusing to permit ex-husband to reopen divorce decree stating that there were three children
born of the marriage); Miller v. Hubbert, 804 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that mother's
alleged false testimony concerning parentage of children was not extrinsic fraud which would justify denial of
application of res judicata); Marriage of Holland, 730 P. 2d 410, 417 (Mont. 1986) (holding that issue of
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courts have rejected motions for relief from judgment where the ex-husband failed
to allege fraud that prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his side of the
case26 6 or there was no fraud committed by a mother who believed that husband
was the biological father.
In some states, legislatures have responded to judicial applications of res
judicata against ex-husbands who sought to disavow paternity post-divorce with
statutory amendments that specifically permit men who have been adjudicated legal
fathers to re-open such judgments at any time.267
3. Mother Denies Presumed Father's Paternity During or Following
Divorce: Cavanaugh v. deBaudiniere
The mother, Aliette, was a French citizen and accomplished artist and
scholar who studied in both France and Tokyo. 8 She first met her husband,
Thomas, a native of Omaha, Nebraska, in 1973, and their relationship began in
1975.269 Their relationship continued with some interruptions for the next thirteen
years, when Aliette finally accepted one of Thomas' many proposals of marriage
during a visit in San Francisco in late July of 1988.270 While they were apart, and as
paternity is res judicata where divorce decree listed child of marriage); John R. v. Lynn R., 688 N.Y.S.2d
218, 219 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999); but see, Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597, 599-600 (Ind. 1990)
(permitting ex-husband who stumbled upon genetic information in effort to identify source of child's sickle
cell anemia eleven years after divorce became final to challenge paternity due to public policy disfavoring
support order against an ex-husband who is not child's father that outweighs importance of stability in legally
established relationships between parent and child). A lower Indiana court later rejected genetic testing
results when the man did not discover the evidence through medical tests for purposes other than to disprove
paternity. See Pinter v. Pinter, 641 N.E.2d 101, 104-105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
266 See, e.g., Pinter v. Pinter, 641 N.E.2d 101, 104-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Pippin v. Jones, 856 P.2d
609, 611 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993); Mr. G. v. Mrs. G., 465 S.E.2d 101, 104 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); Godin v.
Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 909 (Vt. 1998).
267 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1 (Supp. 2000), which was amended in 1994 to permit adjudicated
father to re-open paternity judgments at any time, and appears to have been passed in response to an Alabama
court decision in Ex parte W.J., 622 So. 2d 358, 361-62 (Ala. 1993), in which the court found that the
presumed father could not reopen the divorce judgment when he had reason to know at the time of the
divorce proceeding that he was not the biological father but had failed to act on that knowledge within a
reasonable time. In addition, the Maryland legislature quickly overturned a judicial decision holding that an
adjudicated father who did not request a blood test in the original paternity proceeding could not reopen the
paternity declaration unless he was able to show fraud, mistake, or irregularity. Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 648
A.2d 439 (Md. 1994) was overturned by 1995 Md. Laws, Ch. 248, which allows adjudicated fathers to reopen
and challenge the paternity declaration against them when they are excluded as the biological father by a
post-declaration blood or genetic test. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(2)(1)(2) (1999). See also,
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45fl(b-5) (West 1999) (permitting men to bring actions to declare the non-
existence of the parent-child relationship subsequent to an adjudication of paternity if, as a result of genetic
testing, it is discovered that the man is not the biological father of the child). The legislatures in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey have also considered similar bills, although none have yet become law. See S. 516, 184th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2000) (approved by the Pennsylvania Senate on June 5, 2000); Assem. Bill 2675, 209th
Leg. (N.J. 2000).
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late as July 15 of 1988, Aliette had an affair with Terry Jaicomino.271 When Aliette
discovered in September of 1988 that she was pregnant, she felt sure that Thomas
was the child's father.27 2 Aliette and Thomas married, and a daughter, Tia, was
born in March, 1989.273 Thomas was named as the father on the birth certificate.
274
When Tia was nine months old, Aliette told Thomas that she believed that Tia
looked like Jaicomino, and that Jaicomino could be the father.2 5 Both parents
continued to take care of Tia as their child. 6
While Thomas initially thanked Aliette for her honesty, his behavior
toward her changed, and they became increasingly estranged.2 7 In June, 1991,
Thomas hid Tia from Aliette and obtained an order giving him temporary custody
of Tia.278 Aliette denied in this proceeding that Thomas was Tia's biological father
and obtained a blood test that demonstrated that Thomas was not the biological
father.279 The mother argued that she should have custody because Thomas had no
biological relationship to Tia.280 Both legal paternity and custody of Tia were
presented to the court for resolution.281
The Nebraska court faced with this paternity dispute found that the mother
was permitted to dispute her husband's paternity and that his nonpaternity could be
determined on the evidence obtained from HLA testing.28 2 Other state statutes and
case law also permit mothers to contest their husband's paternity based on genetic
tests requested at the time of divorce.83
Although many other states appear to permit mothers to contest their
husband's paternity at the time of divorce, in practice many of these challenges are
prevented by judicial application of equitable estoppel doctrine. Presumed fathers
faced with their wives' efforts to disestablish their paternity often assert that they
undertook the obligations of parenthood based on their wivess representations of
fatherhood and that they wish to continue their father-child relationship. Courts
271 See id.
272 See id.




277 See id. at 201.




282 See id. at 206.
283 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.826.1 (West 1996); Golden v. Golden, 942 S.W.2d 282 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1997); Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Ind. 1997); Thompson v. Thompson, 1995 WL 481480
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1995).
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have been far more sympathetic to the equitable estoppel claims of presumed
fathers than those of their children.
For example, in Marriage of K.E. V,284 the mother was equitably estopped
from denying her husband's paternity where she had always acted as if her husband
was the girl's father and he had acted on that belief.285 Courts generally appear to
assume that mothers know the biological facts of their child's parentage and apply
equitable estoppel to their failure to inform their husband of that information.286
Equitable estoppel has not been applied, however, where the mother informed the
husband that he was not the biological father and he voluntarily continued the
parent-child relationship. 287 A few courts have also found that a non-biological
father acquired paternity rights through the doctrine of "equitable parent" and
"equitable adoption., 288
Timing has also been found to be important in the context of mothers'
challenges to their husbands' paternity. Mothers have sometimes been prevented
from raising the nonpaternity of their husbands because of a statute of limitations or
a court's decision that the claim was not brought within a reasonable period of
time.2 89 In the post-divorce period, estoppel and laches have been employed to
prevent mothers from asserting their ex-husbands' nonpatemity following a final
divorce decree.290 In addition, mothers have had little success with motions for
284 883 P.2d 1246 (Mont. 1994).
285 See id. at 1253.
286 See, e.g., Boyles v. Boyles, 466 N.Y.S.2d 762, 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (estopping mother who
encouraged development of father-child relationship between husband and son from challenging husband's
paternity upon divorce); Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 912-13 (R.I. 1990) (equitably estopping wife
from denying husband's paternity where attempting to illegitinize child "by attacking the legal presumption
of paternity that she helped to bring about"); In re Paternity of D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (invoking equitable estoppel against mother who permitted husband to develop father-child
relationship with child). At least one mother has successfully avoided possible estoppel, however, by
bringing the action to establish paternity in someone other than her ex-husband by filing the petition for
genetic testing as next friend of her child, J.W.L. See In re Paternity of J.W.L., 682 N.E. 2d 519, 520 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998).
287 See Crouse v. Crouse, 552 N.W.2d 413,417 (S.D. 1996) (applying Iowa law).
288 In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1995) (remanding case to determine
whether nonbiological father should be found to be an "equitable parent"); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408
N.W.2d 516, 518-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding equitable estoppel did not preclude wife from admitting
blood tests disproving her husband's paternity, but her husband had acquired paternity rights through the
doctrines of "equitable parent" and "equitable estoppel").
289 See Riddle v. Riddle, 619 N.E.2d 1201, 1202 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1992) (laches and equitable estoppel
prevented mother from claiming the husband was not biological father where she had allowed him to believe
he was father for more than five years).
290 See In re Donna M., 637 A.2d 795, 803 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (equitably estopping mother from
denying husband's paternity where she asserted husband's paternity in divorce proceeding and ex-husband had
paid child support based on belief that he was biological father); Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501, 507 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1995) (estopping mother from disputing paternity after she signed divorce decree identifying former
husband as father); In re Marriage of Klebs, 554 N.E.2d 298, 305 (ill. App. Ct. 1993) (barring mother from
bringing a subsequent action to vacate portion of divorce decree that established that child was born in
marriage to first husband).
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relief from divorce judgments.'
By and large, mothers have achieved little success in disestablishing the
paternity of husbands or ex-husbands. Even where the state statutory language
seems to permit such disestablishment, courts have been extremely reluctant to
dissolve parent-child ties that presumed fathers want to maintain. Presumed fathers,
not mothers, usually are able to choose whether they will continue to parent a
nonbiological child post-divorce. In those few cases in which a presumed father's
paternity was disestablished against his will, most of the courts employed the in
loco parentis doctrine or other doctrines to continue a deposed father's right to
shared custody or visitation. 2
V. UNCOVERING THE JUDICIAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT PATERNTY
The often heart-wrenching disputes involving the marital presumption of
paternity take place in a social context in which fatherhood is receiving a lot of
attention. It is the subject of research, academic conferences, policy initiatives, and
political action groups. Researchers probe the importance of fathers to child
development and the ways in which married and unmarried fathers parent their
children, policymakers try to enforce child support obligations against unwed and
divorced fathers, and local action groups work to enable unwed fathers to provide
the parenting their children need.293 Divorced fathers have joined forces to advocate
for legislative and judicial changes that would increase their access to their children
post-divorce. Gay men who are raising children in committed relationships Reek
legal protections for their parent-child relationships.294 Stepfathers seek to continue
parent-child relationships they maintained during their marriage to the children's
mother."5
Although much of this activity seeks to affirm fathering roles, there are
also efforts to limit paternal responsibilities. Divorced and unwed fathers drift away
from their children at disappointingly high rates.9 6 Many stepfathers are
uninterested in maintaining paternal roles after divorce. Children who thought they
were being parented by a father, biological or otherwise, may find themselves with
291 See, e.g., Worcester v. Worcester, 960 P.2d 624, 626 (Ariz. 1998).
292 See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. deBaudiniere, 493 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (applying in
loco parentis doctrine); Gilbert A. v. Laura A., 689 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding that
mother's involvement in development of father-child relationship between husband and son constituted
extraordinary circumstance that may justify visitation with or custody of son by ex-husband).
293 See, e.g., DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER (1996); DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS
AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); Joe Jones, Director, Strive
Baltimore, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 2000) (describing
his organization's program to encourage the involvement of unwed fathers in the lives of their children).
294 See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
295 The Pennsylvania Supreme court recently awarded custody to a stepfather over the biological
father. See Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255, 1257 (Pa. 2000).
296 See Judith Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: A Society in Search of Policy, in ALL OUR FAMILIES,
supra note 1, at 66, 75.
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no man who wants to be responsible for them once their "father's" relationship
with their mother disintegrates.297
One source of all of this activity seems to be the felt need to redefine
fathering in an era when fatherhood based on both biology and marriage is less
dominant. Biological father-child relationships outside marriage and father-child
relationships either within or outside marriage that are not based on biological ties
or legal adoption are not new, but they are present at much, much higher rates than
early in the twentieth century, a rate that accelerated quickly beginning in the
1970's.298 Similarly, the technology to ascertain biological ties has developed quite
recently.299 Our cultural assumption that fatherhood is based on the twin links of
biology and marriage has thus come under assault from two different directions: the
increased number of children living with divorced or never married mothers and
the new technologies readily available to ascertain a child's biological father.
What, then, is to be made of the splintering of our deeply held beliefs
about fatherhood? Cases involving challenges to the marital presumption of
paternity strike at the heart of this cultural belief. Judges must determine what, in
fatherhood, truly matters. The conflicting doctrines they employ and outcomes they
reach reveal their contradictory, and usually briefly stated, assumptions about
fatherhood, its rights and responsibilities. Rarely do courts rely on expert evidence
or legislative factfinding to support their conclusions.
The complex web of assumptions that have governed judicial
decisionmaking in paternity disputes involving the marital presumption of paternity
fall into several main categories. While these categories overlap and different
assumptions are combined by different judges, they aid in the identification of the
central choices that will need to be made to determine the future of the marital
presumption of paternity. These categories include: the necessity of having a
marital presumption of paternity; competing assumptions regarding the "true"
basis of fatherhood; the extent to which the marital relationship should be
privileged over other relationships; whether fairness to alleged or presumed fathers
or the needs of children should be given primary consideration; the role of moral
judgments in the decisionmaking process; and finally, whether children can have,
and whether the law should recognize, more than one father.
Why worry about these unsupported assumptions? For children,
relationships with parents and siblings are the most important relationships in their
lives, and supportive, dependable, loving parenting is the most important factor in
their healthy development into adults.300 Conflicts that involve the marital
presumption of paternity undermine these essential relationships, often
unexpectedly. Whether two fathers compete to assert their paternity, their mothers
try to sever social father-child relationships, or fathers abandon children upon
297 See Woodhouse Testimony, supra note 15, at 6.
298 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
299 See discussion supra Part I.
300 See, e.g., Joan B.. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make
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discovering they are not biological fathers, children: lose the predictability and
security they so need. Law cannot protect all children from abandonment and
conflict created by their parents, biological or social. However, few would argue
that the current legal chaos and uncertainty surrounding the paternity of children
born during a marriage adequately protects children.
A. Presuming the Presumption
There is universal agreement among the courts that the marital
presumption of paternity is centrally important. Justice Scalia and numerous other
judges have described it as "a fundamental principle of the common law."30' It is
often described as "one of the strongest presumptions known to law."
30 2
The drafters of the UPA (1973) adopted the importance of presumptions of
paternity and sought to expand those presumptions to certain nonmarital fathers.
The Prefatory Note assumes their utility:
In order to identify the father, the Act first sets up a network of
presumptions which cover cases in which proof of external
circumstances (in the simplest case, marriage between the mother
and a man) indicate a particular man to be the probable father.
While perhaps no one state now includes all these presumptions in
its law, the presumptions are based on existing presumptions of
'legitimacy' in state laws and do not represent a serious departure.
Novel is that they have been collected under one roof. All
presumptions of paternity are rebuttable in appropriate
circumstances. °3
In none of the judicial opinions is the utility of a presumption questioned -
courts merely focus on the circumstances in which the presumption should be
rebuttable. Given the increasing ease of rebutting the presumption, however, and
the lack of security it currently provides to children born during their mother's
marriage, it may be time to question the assumption that die marital presumption of
paternity is beneficial and protects children. Certainty of biological paternity at
birth may, in fact, better protect children given the prevalence of divorce.
B. Competing Assumptions Regarding the "True" Basis of Fatherhood
A second important assumption is whether biological or social
relationships form the dispositive basis of a father-child relationship.304 Some
301 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
302 See, e.g., Casbar v. Dicanio, 666 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Brabham v.
Brabham, 483 So. 2d 341, 342 (Miss. 1986); Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 869 (V. Va. 1989).
303 UPA (1973), supra note 13, at 289. The marital presumption was preserved in the UPA (2000)
without any explanation. See UPA (2000), supra note 35, § 204.
304 See Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461,
20001
41
Glennon: Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumpti
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
courts have cited biology as the dispositive factor, relying on common law doctrine
dating back to Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries, which stated:
[T]he duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their
children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation laid on them
not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing
them into the world: . . . By begetting them therefore they have
entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them
lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and
preserved."'
This approach equates biology and fatherhood. Under this perspective,
fatherhood is simply a biological relationship. Our child support system for
nonmarital children is governed by the assumption that men are financially
responsible for any children they created through their sexual intercourse with a
woman.30 6 The choice to have sexual intercourse carries with it the responsibility to
provide for any children that result from the sexual relationship. The pre-eminence
of the biological relationship in determining paternity is demonstrated in cases
where biological fathers have unsuccessfully argued that they should not be
responsible for child support because they were victims of statutory rape, the
mother had fraudulently claimed that she was using birth control, or the mother
refused to have an abortion or give the child up for adoption.0 r
In this view, defining fatherhood on any basis other than biology
perpetuates a falsehood, one that the law should not countenance.308 This unity of
biology and fatherhood is so apparent to these courts that it needs no further
substantiation or analysis. Biological ties are thus the source of legal father-child
relationships.
What are the consequences of making biological relationships the
dominant basis of legal fatherhood? If biological relationships trump all other
sources of a father-child relationship, then all alleged biological fathers would be
able to assert their paternity rights over children, whether they are born within
marriage or not, or whether another man has parented the child for a substantial
period of time. Likewise, at any point that genetic testing shows that a presumed
father is not the "true" father, he would become a third party to the child, with no
equal rights to custody with the mother in the event of divorce and with the right to
simply walk away from parenting and child support once that information becomes
known. Except for cases of legal adoption, paternal rights and responsibilities
473-77 (evaluating the advantages and costs of basing legal fatherhood on biological paternity).
305 Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 548 (Md. 1986) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*447).
306 See Harris, supra note 304, at 465.
307 See id. at 465 (collecting cases).
308 "I simply cannot agree with the majority's view that a government (through its courts) is entitled to
determine in a particular case that one will be better off by the perpetuation of a falsity and the suppression of
relevant, unprivileged facts." Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 910 (Md. 1993) (Eldridge, J., concurring).
[Vol. 102:547
42
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss3/5
THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY
would attach to biological relationships and guide the courts' decisionmaking.
A second view with much less current support assumes that fatherhood and
marriage go together. The legal commitment of marriage to the child's mother
would form the basis of the opportunity to parent as well as the responsibility to do
so. Some courts, as described below, highlight the protection of the marital
relationship in resolving many of these disputes. However, at no time have the
courts been willing to fully equate marriage to the mother and legal fatherhood. In
Lord Mansfield's day, being beyond the seas, or the testimony of others of lack of
access to sexual intercourse between the husband and wife, was sufficient to
undermine the marital presumption of paternity. 9 One state that until recently
closely adhered to the common law approach by limiting challenges to paternity to
lack of access, sterility, and impotence still refused to impose paternal obligations
where the parents were already separated by the time of the child's birth and the
marriage did not create any opportunity to develop a parent-child relationship.'
A third view focuses on the existence of a social father-child relationship
based on either biological connection or marriage to the mother as the primary
determinant for paternity in a variety of situations. In these cases, marriage and
biology are viewed as providing an opportunity to create a father-child relationship.
The man's investment in the relationship with the child, not the existence or lack of
the biological or marriage relationship, captures the courts' focus.31' They have
given little weight to the biological connection, some going as far as to find that
proof of a biological connection, without more, is irrelevant to a determination of
whether someone other than the husband and presumed father is the legal father. 12
This approach, which places importance on caretaking relationships, has
been used by a few courts to permit an alleged biological father to assert his
paternity rights over a child born into an intact marriage where the man has a
developed relationship with the child or it is in the child's interest to develop that
social relationship.313 It has also been used by some courts to protect the father-
child relationships of presumed fathers who are not genetically related to the
children they have parented and want to continue to parent. 14
Courts adopting this approach have emphasized that actual caretaking, not
biology, is the true test of fatherhood. One California court has argued that "[i]t is
questionable whether it is to the child's benefit, emotionally and developmentally,
3D9 See The "Lord Mansfield Rule," supra note 114, at 81.
310 See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 710 A.2d 61, 64-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). More recently,
Pennsylvania courts have refused to apply the marital presumption of paternity where the marriage is no
longer intact. See, e.g., Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. CL 2000).
311 See, e.g., State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 563 (W. Va. 1996) (finding that
putative biological father who has made substantial personal investment in his relationship with child has
liberty interest in maintaining such relationship).
312 See G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
313 See, e.g., C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Mass. 1990).
314 See, e.g., Boyles v. Boyles, 466 N.Y.S.2d 762,766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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to establish biological parenthood for some abstract interest in truthfulness.
3 15
Instead, the court looked to the relationship between the child and the presumed
father, which it found to be "more palpable than the biological relationship of
actual paternity ... This social relationship is much more important, to the child at
least, than a biological relationship of actual paternity...." 1 6
Prioritizing the social relationship in determining paternity does not,
however, always provide as much clarity as the biological approach to fatherhood.
Courts that rely on the importance of social parenting have come to conflicting
conclusions about the obligations of husbands who challenge their paternity of the
children born during their marriage to the children's mother. While some courts
have found that the social father-child relationship in the context of marriage is a
sufficient basis for imposing the obligation of support throughout childhood, others
have seen it as a voluntary social relationship that can be terminated by the
father.
3 17
Although most courts have limited their reliance on social relationships to
those created only in the contexts of marriage or biological relationships, Professor
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and others have argued forcefully that courts should
protect actual caretaking of children. They argue that male or female partners of
mothers who nurture the mother and child through pregnancy and some period of
childhood should not be denied legal parental status because they are not the
biological parent of the child or marital partner of the mother.1 8 A small number of
courts have adopted this "functional" approach to parenting, often through the
application of the in loco parentis doctrine.31 9
C. Privileging the Marital Relationship Over Other Family Relationships
Courts universally agree that public policy requires them to privilege
marital relationships over nonmarital relationships. 20 Courts often justify
privileging the marital relationship on the ground that parenthood within marriage
315 Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
316 Id. at 124 (quoting Estate of Comelious, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (Cal. 1984)).
317 See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
318 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parental
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1754-57 (1993) (arguing that unmarried partner of a biological mother
who has nurtured mother and child throughout pregnancy and some period of childhood should not be robbed
of legal parental status because he is not the biological father of the child); Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 508-22 (1990) (defining legal parenthood to include "anyone who
maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a legally recognized parent created that
relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in nature," combining a functional approach with
a degree of control by the child's legal parent).
319 See, e.g., J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that non-legal
parent may have standing to seek partial custody of biological child of former lesbian partner if she can
establish that she stood in loco parentis to child during relationship).
320 Some scholars, however, have disputed this assumption, see, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive
Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 1063 (1998).
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best protects children. Thus, courts should promote parenting within, not outside of,
marriage. Even the drafters of the UPA (1973), who explicitly sought to equalize
the legal status of all children, retained disparate treatment of children born within
and outside of marriage. For example, although the UPA (1973) established
presumptions that are not based on a marital relationship between the mother and
the presumed father, it treated those presumptions differently.121 Presumptions of
paternity based on the conduct of the unwed father, such as accepting the child into
his home and holding him out to others as his child, were eliminated in the UPA
(2000).
32
No court has argued that the marital family should be treated in exactly the
same manner as the nonmarital family. Some scholars, however, have argued
against this privileging of the marital relationship. Professor Gary Melton has
argued that "the adoption of a broad definition of family often both brings law into
harmony with changing social reality and promotes ends consistent with public
policy... The degree of legal recognition that various relationships attain is likely
to affect their stability and individuals' sense of satisfaction with them., 323
Scholars have also pointed to the ways in which the lack of recognition of
nonmarital families has perpetuated a power imbalance between men and
women.
324
Despite the universal judicial assumption that marital relationships and
families should be privileged in most contexts, courts and legislatures have
developed different assumptions about what it means to protect marital
relationships. At one end of the scale, a minority of states give the intact marital
relationship broad protection from the efforts of an alleged biological father-
holding the marital presumption to be irrebuttable in such a circumstance.325 Courts
that provide strong protection are generally quite vague about their reasoning,
simply invoking the existence of an intact marriage and the policy that the state will
support that intact marriage.32 They simply state that denying a paternity petition
by a putative biological father protects marriages.327
The unstated presumption about marriage is that the marital relationship
321 UPA (1973), supra note 13.
322 UPA (2000), supra note 35, § 606.
323 Gary B. Melton, The Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families, 22 GA.
L. REV. 851, 884-85 (1988).
324 See Mary Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption and Sex Equality: Gender-neutrality and the
Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 60 (1995).
325 See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999)
326 See, e.g., Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (court follows statute's
mandate but questions creation of a "fictional family"); G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721,723 (Pa. 1999) (court states that policy of the state is to preserve intact
marriages but did not apply such a policy because there was no longer an intact marriage).
327 See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1056 (Pa. 1999), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated, "[ilt is in precisely this situation, as was suggested in John M., that the presumption of paternity
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could not survive the presence of the biological father. This is a somewhat curious
presumption, because these are not situations where the husband is unaware of the
claims of the biological father, which have already been brought to court.328 Thus,
the marital relationship has already had to survive knowledge of the original
betrayal, the mother's sexual relationship with someone outside the marriage. The
presumption that the biological father's assertion of paternity and visitation rights
interferes with the intact marriage is interesting in a society in which numerous
blended families negotiate the terrain of different parental relationships on a daily
basis.329 Yet this threat is considered so clear to courts making this assumption that
they consider it unnecessary to take evidence on or analyze why a child's
relationship with a different father is such a threat to the "intact" family unit.3 0
This protection of family relationships that were developed in the context
of marriage may continue after the marriage has ended, protecting the parent-child
bonds formed during the marriage. 3 ' Other courts, however, treat protection of the
marital relationship as more important than the parent-child relationship.
3 2
Thus, some courts allow presumed fathers to disestablish paternity upon
divorce even though they knew or strongly suspected that they were not biological
fathers but chose to fill the role of father during the marriage anyway.? To these
courts, the presumed father acted properly by deciding not to challenge the child's
paternity during the marriage because that would have threatened the marital
relationship.3 4 Once the marriage ends in divorce, however, the nonbiological
father-child relationship is treated as a mere adjunct to the marriage, terminable
with the end of the marriage. If the only important relationship in the family is the
marriage relationship, then divorce terminates that relationship and the need to
"[preserve] the family unit.
'335
Thereafter, the presumed father bears no further responsibility to the child,
because his relationship to the child no longer serves to keep the marriage together.
This type of protection of the marriage is usually justified as protecting the best
interests of the children born during the marriage. However, where presumed
fathers are able to protect their father-child relationships from intrusion during
328 See, e.g., Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. CL App. 1998) (upholding California
law denying paternity action brought by biological father but noting that "where all the parties know who is
the biological father, there is no reason to assume the integrity of the 'family' will be in jeopardy if visitation
is allowed").
329 This view does have its academic supporters as well. See, e.g., Hadek, supra note 33.
330 See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999).
331 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "the
state has a well-recognized interest in preserving and protecting the dignity of parental relationships,
especially when a marriage is being dissolved and instability is being introduced into a child's life").
332 See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) (holding that presumption of paternity applies
only to intact marriages).
333 See, e.g., Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 550 (Md. 1986).
See id.
335 Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 870 (W. Va. 1989); Aicia R. v. Timothy M., 34 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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marriage but terminate them upon divorce, it is the interests of presumed fathers,
not children, that seem to be best served. Rather than assuring that children's
parental relationships are protected, these courts may simply be ensuring that
presumed fathers can have it both ways: it is their choice upon divorce to maintain
or terminate their nonbiological father-child relationships. 6
In contrast to this view of the marriage relationship as the locus of judicial
protection, other courts have viewed the family relationships to be protected more
broadly. Once again, the protection of the relationships is related to the original
marital context. However, within this broader perspective, some courts have
assumed that all relationships developed within that context are entitled to
protection that does not end upon divorce. For example, in In re Marriage of
Freeman,337 the court found that the state "has a well-recognized interest in
preserving and protecting the dignity of parental relationships, especially when a
marriage is being dissolved and instability is being introduced into a child's
life."wm
Through legal doctrines such as the best interests of the child or equitable
estoppel, some courts have determined that the public policy interest in protecting
marital families includes protecting the parent-child relationship even after the
collapse of the marriage. Washington state courts apply a "best interests of the
child" analysis to efforts by presumed fathers to disestablish paternity at the time
of divorce.339 In Miscovich v. Miscovich,34" a Pennsylvania court found that
although the marriage had ended, "a parent-child bond was formed."3 41 This
parent-child bond was adequate to estop the presumed father from contesting his
paternity of the child. 42
At the other end of the spectrum, the intact marital family relationship is
given only a minimum of protection. In those instances, nonmarital biological
fathers may assert their paternity over a child born during a marriage with few
limitations.m Likewise, the nonbiological father is subject to loss of paternity by
action of the mother?"
The universal judicial and legislative presumption that marital families
should receive protections not available to other families and the conflicting
336 See Mary Louise Fellows, The Kingdom of the Fathers, 10 L. & INEQ. J. 137 (1991).
337 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
338 Id at 448
39 In re Marriage of Wendy M., 962 P.2d 130,132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
340 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
341 Id. at 733. See also Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999); Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d
405 (Pa. Super. Ct 2000).
342 See id.
343 See, e.g., K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1996) (holding that Indiana law permits a man who
claims to be the biological father of a child born during the marriage of the child's mother and another man to
file a paternity action while that marriage remains intact).
344 See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513 (Ind. 1997).
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assumptions courts make about protection of the marital family need to be carefully
evaluated.
D. Prioritizing Fairness to Men or the Protection of Children
In these disputed parentage cases, the interests and rights of the parties are
in deep conflict. Rarely does the interest of the mother, who is seen as the
wrongdoer, receive any attention. 4  Mothers' expressed preferences are generally
ignored or disregarded, or they may not even be mentioned.346
The courts do often explicitly recognize, however, that the rights and
interests of the presumed father, alleged biological father, and child may well be in
conflict. The interests of the two possible fathers and the child compete for center
stage. Some courts appear to prioritize fairness to men as the most important factor,
whether the men are seeking freedom from support for nonbiological children or
legal protection for a parent-child relationship. In contrast, other courts prioritize
the "best interests of the child" in all of their decisions. 34
What are the often contested assumptions about the meaning of fairness to
men? The issue of choice seems to be at the heart of all of the competing
assumptions. Courts hesitate to impose the burdens of parenthood unless presumed
fathers voluntarily assumed longlasting parental obligations toward the child. 3
Courts and legislators have long assumed that the sexual relationship that created
the biological relationship is an adequate basis for determining a man to be a
voluntary father.34 9 Among the courts that assume that voluntariness is a key
concern in decisions concerning nonbiological presumed fathers, however, there
are differences in what constitutes a voluntary relationship. Some courts focus on
knowledge as choice, finding that it would be unfair to place continued support
obligations on a man who developed a parent-child relationship with his wife's
children unaware that he was not the biological father.350 In these cases, lack of
345 One Washington court explicitly stated that there are three entities with interests that are
implicated in paternity determinations: "the child, the putative parent, and the State." In re Marriage of
Wendy M.., 962 P.2d 130, 132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
346 This absence of the mother raises serious concerns about judicial fairness that requires further
exploration that is beyond the scope of this preliminary exploration of the issues raised by the marital
presumption of paternity. Mary Louise Fellows has explored some of the feminist concerns about the marital
presumption of paternity in A Feminist Interpretation of the Law and Legitimacy, 7 TEx. J WOMEN & L. 195
(1998) [hereinafter Fellows, A Feminist Interpretation].
347 See, e.g., McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987).
348 Presumed fathers who have discovered after divorce that they are not the biological father of their
children have also become passionate advocates for freeing men from parental responsibilities they believe
they have been defrauded into forming. See, e.g., Robert Schwaneberg, The Ties That Bind - What Happens
When Genetic Testing Proves the Child is Not Yours After All, THE STAR-LEDGER, March 18, 2001, available
in 2001 WL 16668197(reporting that man who learned post-divorce that daughter was not his biological
offspring engaged in advocacy that inspired legislator to offer legislation permitting men in this situation to
rebut paternity with the results of genetic testing).
349 See Daniel Callahan, Bioethics and Fatherhood, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 735, 737-39.
350 See, e.g., Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1993).
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knowledge of a child's biological parentage is key to freeing the presumed father
from his support obligations.25 The lack of knowledge presumably made him
unable to make a free choice to parent or not parent the child. Others, however,
have seen the acceptance of parental responsibilities for a lengthy period of time,
even without knowledge of the lack of a biological relationship, as a sufficient
basis of voluntariness.
352
Courts that face situations where the presumed father assumed a parental
role cognizant of the lack of a biological relationship have arrived at opposite
conclusions. Some have found that assumption of the obligations of parenthood
with knowledge by the presumed father that he wasnot the biological father equals
a voluntary assumption of permanent parenthood. Others have gone in the other
direction: assumption of parental responsibilities for a child even with the
knowledge that there is no biological father-child relationship does not evidence
voluntariness concerning continued support after divorce from the child's
mother.' This approach is justified as permitting presumed fathers to choose to
assume the role of parent during the marriage without fear of later financial
repercussions." s
Fairness to biological fathers who are not married to the mothers has also
been of great concern. Some courts have focused on the importance of the
biological connection, and several have given it constitutional weight. 356 Although
some courts believe that all unwed fathers have a constitutional right to have their
timely assertions of paternity recognized,357 others have determined that it would
not be fair to deny these men the joys of fatherhood without at least a hearing on
whether it would be in the child's interest to have their paternity acknowledged.358
Other courts that have focused on fairness to biological fathers note that because
the biological relationship is an adequate basis for a judicial determination of
paternity and its accompanying support obligation, it is not fair to impose that
burden on biological fathers without also permitting them to assert their paternity
351 See id. at 1168.
352 See Watts v. Watts, 337 A.2d 350 (N.H. 1975). See also, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 3 (West
1998), which makes child a member of the family if the child lives with the mother and husband for two years
as an uncontested member of the family.
3 See, e.g., M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775 (NJ. 1985); Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I.
1994).
35 See, e.g., C.H.H. v. H.H., 696 So. 2d 1076 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); B.E. B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514
(Alaska 1999).
355 See B.E.B. v. L.T.B., 979 P.2d at 519. Courts analogize these presumed fathers to stepfathers,
who are able to assume financial and emotional responsibility for their spouse's children without
automatically volunteering to support them after divorce. See, e.g, Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1167
(D.C. 1993).
356 See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1999).
357 See, e.g., In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994).
358 See, e.g., In re the Paternity of "Adam," 903 P.2d 207 (Mont. 1995).
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rights when they choose to do So.359
Although some courts have assumed that their focus should be fairness to
presumed and putative fathers, other courts have assumed that they should place the
best interests of the child at the center of their analysis.36 Thus, some courts that
recognize the biological father's right to claim paternity will only order genetic
testing or enter a judgment of legal paternity in the biological father when it serves
the best interests of the child.36'
The most difficult conflicts between father and child arise when a
presumed father wants to terminate a longstanding father-child relationship. While
most courts recognize that abandonment by a child's psychological father is
devastating to a child,36 they have differed dramatically in their views whether that
is a legal detriment from which the child deserves judicial protection. This issue
has come up in several different doctrinal contexts, making apparent conflicting
assumptions about children and their needs and experiences.
One harm to the child that has received some judicial attention is the social
injury that may result from the removal of the "cloak of legitimacy" from the
child.363 Other courts have found that the social stigma and legal disabilities of
illegitimacy have diminished dramatically, severely reducing this concern."
Some courts also consider whether children have been harmed by being
denied the opportunity to develop a relationship with their natural father.365 These
courts have held to this position even where the husband no longer wishes to parent
or support the child, once again focusing on the harm to the child:
[T]he law cannot permit a party to renounce even an assumed duty
of parentage when by doing so, the innocent child would be
victimized. Relying upon the representation of the parental
relationship, a child naturally and normally extends his love and
affection to the putative parent. The representation of parentage
inevitably obscures the identity and whereabouts of the natural
father, so that the child will be denied the love, affection and
support of the natural father. As time wears on, the fiction of
parentage reduces the likelihood that the child will ever have the
opportunity of knowing or receiving the love of his natural father.
359 See, e.g, Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 191 (Iowa 1999).
360 See, e.g., Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 872 (W. Va. 1989). The court states,
however, that the preference for the interests of the child may not prevail if there is "proof of fraudulent
conduct which prevented the putative father from questioning paternity". Id.
361 See, e.g., Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014, 1017-18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); M.F. v. N.H., 599 A.2d
1297, 1300 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
362 See, e.g., B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 519 (Alaska 1999).
363 Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
364 See Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 869-70 (W. Va. 1989); State ex. rel. of J.R. v.
Mendoza, 481 N.W.2d 165, 172 (Neb. 1992).
365 See, e.g., Michael K.T., 387 S.E.2d at 872.
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While the law cannot prohibit the putative father from informing
the child of their true relationship, it can prohibit him from
employing the sanctions of the law to avoid the obligations which
their assumed relationship would otherwise impose.
366
In sharp contrast, however, are decisions that the child's undeveloped
relationship with his or her biological father is a legally recognizable harm only
when the presumed father has actively interfered with the child's receipt of
financial support from his or her biological father.367
Judicial conflicts about whether a child's best interests lie in knowing the
identity of his biological father or in maintaining whatever father-child relationship
already exists are also apparent.368 Although some courts treat the determination of
this priority as a factual question to be determined on a case-by-case basis, 69 others
have made this judgment as a matter of law, applicable to all situations. 70
Finally, some courts have focused more on the emotional injury to the
child. As the dissenter in Knill v. Knill 71 pointed out, "nothing could be more
devastating to the fragile psychology of a child than the sudden breach of a long-
established paternal relationship followed by being proclaimed a bastard and left
without a father."372 Those courts that focus on the emotional injury to the child
generally also reach their conclusions without the benefit of expert testimony. They
make numerous assumptions about the nature of children's relationships with their
fathers and whether they will experience an emotional loss from the termination of
those relationships. For example, one court found it doubtful that a two year old
child "relied in any meaningful sense on any representation of paternity that the
husband may have made. 3 73 The court came to this conclusion without the aid of
any expert testimony on the understanding or attachment levels of young children
to their parents. 74
In other cases, judges barely mention the emotional injury to the child, and
366 Id. at 871-72 (quoting Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416, 419 (Pa. Super. 1976)).
367 See, e.g., Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 550 (Md. 1986); Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J.
1984).
368 In re Marriage of Swanson, 944 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
369 See id. The court emphasized the importance of the role.of the guardian ad litem in fully
investigating and making a report and recommendation to the court concerning the interests of the individual
child involved in a paternity action. See il
370 See In re the Paternity of S.R.L, 602 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. 1992) (stating that "there is a
substantial public policy in correctly identifying parents and their offspring. Proper identification of parents
and child should prove to be in the best interests of the child for medical or psychological reasons").
371 510 A.2d 546 (Md. 1981).
372 Id. at 556 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting). See also In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 338 (Kan.
1989) (stating that "[w]hen there are changes of the parent figure or other hurtful interruptions, the child's
vulnerabilities and the fragility of the relationship becomes clear") (citations omitted).
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if they do, they blame the mother for causing that emotional injury." In these
cases, the courts argue that the father's action to disavow paternity demonstrates
that the emotional bond between the father and the child has already been broken,
and that the courts are powerless to protect the child from this outcome.376 They
question the assumption that maintaining the legal father-child relationship will
encourage the father to maintain the emotional bond. Rather, as the Alaska
Supreme Court argued:
It is far from obvious that precluding a non-biological father from
challenging paternity can effectively protect his child's emotional
well-being.... Of course, it is arguable that if the father knows
that he will not be able to shirk his support obligation by
challenging paternity, he might be deterred from attempting the
challenge. But any such deterrence would be more than offset by
the risk that a court order requiring the non-biological father to
pay support might itself destroy an otherwise healthy paternal
bond by driving a destructive wedge of bitterness and resentment
between the father and his child. In short, [such a] rule is not
grounded in reality .... [and an] emotional harm standard is not
likely to accomplish this commendable goal.37
Overall, courts have been much more sympathetic to the claims of
presumed fathers that they be permitted to continue their relationships with their
nonbiological children than to similar assertions made on behalf of children. For
example, the same Maryland court that permitted a presumed father to deny
paternity of a fourteen-year-old son he had always treated as his own allowed a
willing presumed father to maintain his father-child relationship if it were in the
child's best interests. 378 This approach had the effect of protecting the father-child
relationship at the option of the father, not the child.
At times, courts fail to recognize the Catch-22 they may create for
children. For example, courts may refuse to permit unmarried alleged biological
fathers to assert paternity in order to protect the marital family.379 However, they
375 See, e.g., Masters v. Worlsey, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
376 See B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 519 (Alaska 1999).
377 Id
378 See Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 904 (Md. 1993). The factors that the Court stressed should
be considered included the stability of the child's current home environment, whether there is an ongoing
family unit, and the child's physical, mental and emotional needs. See id. at 901-02. Interestingly, however,
the Maryland Court of Appeals considered the best interests of the child relevant only to the issue whether the
trial court should have ordered blood tests. Even though the Court found that the trial court should not have
admitted the test results, since the blood test results had already been admitted into evidence, "the cat is now
out of the bag and cannot now be stuffed back in." Id. at 905. Instead, the court remanded the case for a
custody analysis that viewed the presumed father's claims as those of a third party against the biological
mother's claim, which required him to show "exceptional circumstances" in order to be granted custody. Id.
at 906-07.
379 See G.F.C v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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may permit presumed fathers to deny their paternity at any time because of the
public policy that a person is not obliged to provide support for a child who is
neither his adopted or natural child.380 These conflicting assumptions can leave
children vulnerable to abandonment and inadequate financial support. An alleged
biological father who wishes to create a legal and loving relationship with his
biological children may be discouraged from even asserting his claim, yet the
children he is not permitted to parent may later be abandoned by the presumed
father, the very man whose existence prevented their birth father from initiating
that relationship.38'
Even more troubling than the lack of any evidentiary basis for the
assumptions most courts make in this area are the power imbalances that emerge.
Children are often excluded from these proceedings that determine relationships
and responsibilities central to their lives. Fathers, both presumed and biological,
often control the existence of the parent-child relationship. 382 Although these power
imbalances may reflect social reality, they also highlight the incredible
vulnerability children have in their parent-child, and in particular, their father-child
relationships. Because young children give their unquestioning love to their
parents, many of these cases make clear the need to design policies to protect them
in those relationships.
E. Morality and the Marital Presumption of Paternity
Courts express diverse opinions about the morality of the actions of the
involved adult parties. They hold differing views of the morality of presumed
fathers who seek to terminate longstanding father-child relationships. Those courts
that reject equitable estoppel in this context find that a presumed but nonbiological
father who treats a child as his own child has acted in accord with the State's
"public policy of strengthening the family, the basic unit of civilized society. ' ' 383
They consider it honorable for the non-biological presumed father to treat a child as
part of his family despite the lack of a biological connection.384 Because, in this
view, the presumed father has acted above and beyond the call of duty by
380 See DeRico v. Wilson, 714 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). This would not be permitted,
however, where a presumed father has through judicial process resisted the efforts of a biological father to
obtain paternity. S.B. v. D.H., 736 So. 2d 766,767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
381 Indeed, one divorce lawyer has publicly stated that he would consider it malpractice to fail to
suggest to a male client that he consider paternity testing during the divorce proceedings. See Tamar Lewin,
In Genetic Testing for Paternity, Law Often Lags Behind Science, THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 11, 2001,
available in 2001 WL 15482052 (quoting Robert Miller, a Texas lawyer. "'I now advise every man who's
getting a divorce to get paternity testing.' Mr. Miller said. 'I don't like it much, but now it seems like it could
be malpractice not to warn them"').
382 See In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that
"[respondent] cites no authority to show a court has the authority to permit the wishes and best interests of a
child to create a parent-child relationship where none legally exists").
.383 Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546,552 (Md. 1986).
384 See id.; see also, T.P.D. v. A.C.D., 981 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Alaska 1999) (finding that it is
reasonable for presumed father to delay initiating a proceeding to disestablish paternity while still married
because such a proceeding would put a strain on the marriage).
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supporting the child to begin with, he should not be penalized for such admirable
conduct by being forced to continue supporting the child once he no longer chooses
to do so.385
A presumed father's efforts to renounce his paternity after he has
voluntarily developed a father-child relationship with the child has struck a few
courts as reprehensible. In one of the leading cases that found that men were
estopped from denying their paternity, Justice Tobriner stated for the majority that
there is "an innate immorality in the conduct of an adult who for over a decade
accepts and proclaims a child as his own, but then, in order to be relieved of the
child's support, announces, and relies upon, his bastardy. 386 One Pennsylvania
court has recently stated:
We recognize that there is something disgusting about a husband
who, moved by bitterness toward his wife, suddenly questions the
legitimacy of her child whom he had been accepting and
recognizing as his own .... Where the husband has accepted his
wife's child and held it out as his own over a period of time, he is
estopped from denying paternity. 87
Another court responded to the former husband's characterization of his
continuing liability as a father as a charade by describing it as "an attempt to foster
responsible parenting. ' 388 The court also expressed the hope that, for a man who
had cared for the child for eight years prior to distancing himself, his "heart would
follow his money." 389
Although they take differing views of the morality of the presumed and
putative biological father's morality, most courts easily condemn the mother's
actions.390 For example, mothers who failed to tell husbands that they were not the
father are often considered to have engaged in fraud. 91 Interestingly, a mother's
motivation to keep the child's biological identity secret-saving her marriage-is
385 See Knill, 510 A.2d at 552; see also B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 519 (Alaska 1999).
386 Clevenger v. Clevenger, II Cal. Rptr. 707, 716 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
387 Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (quoting Goldman v. Goldman,
184 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962), affd 720 A.2d 764 (1998)). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has recently rejected the presumption of paternity to cases where the marriage is no longer intact, it
does apply estoppel. See id. See also Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1999).
388 Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 1996).
389 Id.
390 See, e.g., Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (denying mother's claim of
equitable estoppel because she "acted inequitably in leading the children and [her ex-husband] to believe that
[the ex-husband] was their biological father").
391 See, e.g., Marriage of K.E.V., 883 P.2d 1246, 1253 (Mont. 1994); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 679
N.E.2d 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (mother knew near time of birth that husband was not biological father so
barred by laches from rebutting husband's paternity).
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seen as a wrongful intent.392 Her motives in later seeking to disestablish paternity
are also brought into question-she may be found to be seeking to disestablish
paternity only to gain sole custody or free the child for adoption by her new
husband. 93
Cases in which the presumed father knew that the child was not
biologically connected to him but believed that the child was conceived through
artificial insemination, not an adulterous affair, provide an interesting challenge to
the courts' assertions that it is either biology or a developed relationship in the
context of a marital family that matters. States generally determine that fathers who
consent to the use of reproductive technologies are the legal fathers of the children
created through use of these reproductive technologies.3 94 Courts have viewed a
mother's misrepresentation that the child was conceived as a result of artificial
insemination when the child was actually conceived during an adulterous affair as a
material difference that protects the presumed father from the responsibilities of
legal fatherhood. In this instance, it is the mother's adulterous relationship, not the
lack of biological connection, that becomes the "relevant fact."' 395 The court's
judgment concerning the morality of the mother's actions rather than the absence of
a biological relationship carried the most weight with these courts.
This raises the interesting possibility that it is in fact the mother's conduct,
not the absence of a biological connection, that is the source of many courts'
unwillingness to consider presumed fathers to still be the legal fathers. Although
many courts say little about the fact of betrayal, it may well be more important than
their stated reasoning would imply.
F. For Love or Money?
What is the essence of legal paternity? Are these paternity disputes about
who a child loves, or who loves a child? Are they veiled attempts to hang on to lost
affairs or exact revenge on spouses for their adultery or some other marital
wrong?"96  Or are paternity cases merely about financial support? 97 And
392 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1995).
393 See, e.g., In re Marriage of K.E.V., 883 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Mont. 1994) (describing mother as
seeking to deny paternity only to obtain sole custody); In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 336 (Kan. 1989)
(finding that mother brought action to free child for adoption by new husband).
394 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (Michie 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(A) (Michie
1997).
See, e.g., Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1163 (D.C. 1993) (refusing to apply equitable estoppel
because mother told husband that child was conceived through artificial insemination when child was actually
conceived through adulterous affair); In re the Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (IIl. App. Ct.
1998) (denying application of estoppel to husband despite ten-year father-child relationship when presumed
father believed child was born as a result of artificial insemination, not an adulterous affair); Kohler v. Bleem,
654 A.2d 569, 576 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied 664 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1995) (finding that presumptive father
who had accepted child until he discovered that the child was not born by artificial insemination but by wife's
adulterous affair with neighbor not bound by estoppel).
396 See, e.g., In re Matter of Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331,338 (Kan. 1989) (stating that "the child
is placed in jeopardy whenever a parent's claim for the child is based solely or predominantly on motives to
score over a warring partner after divorce by replacing the legally presumed father with the biological
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increasingly, are they about paying into the state coffers money the state is
spending to provide for the welfare of the child and his mother?
98
Some courts assume that paternity determinations are about parent-child
relationships. As described above, these courts may focus on the emotional injury
to a child who is suddenly rejected by her psychological father, or the great loss
that would be encountered by a presumed father whose wife or ex-wife seeks to
disestablish his paternity.399 Other courts, however, focus on the financial
ramifications of paternity determinations-they are about who must financially
support children during their minority.400 At times, the supposedly interested parties
and their desires seem irrelevant. At stake is the public's financial interest in
obtaining recompense for its support of children through welfare programs.0 1
G. Can Children Have More Than One Father?
The idea that a child can have two fathers has been widely rejected.02 In
instances where blood tests show that a presumed father is not the biological father,
some courts treat the formerly presumed father as a third party in his efforts to
obtain custody or visitation.403 In these cases, the courts refuse to acknowledge that
the child's experience is that the nonbiological father is, indeed, his or her father.
They treat nonbiological fathers as third persons or stepfathers whose rights to care
and custody of children are subservient to those of biological mothers.4°
One state has clearly recognized dual paternity, and decisions in two other
states point toward the possibility of the recognition of dual paternity. Louisiana
courts have permitted putative biological fathers to bring an action to establish
paternity within a reasonable time of a child's birth without destroying the legal
paternity of the mother's husband. 405 The Louisiana courts have argued that dual
father").
397 See, e.g., B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 519 (Alaska 1999) (application of equitable estoppel
unlikely to protect child from emotional harm; thus, court will limit use of equitable estoppel to situations
involving financial harm).
398 See, e.g., T.P.D. v. A.C.D., 981 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1999) (describing case brought when mother
applied for public assistance shortly after separation from husband and Child Support Enforcement Division
brought action for child support against presumed father); State v. Rogers, 902 S.W.2d 243 (Ark. App. 1995)
(concerning paternity of child in action brought by Child Support Enforcement Unit).
399 See, e.g, Riddle v. Riddle, 619 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1992).
400 See, e.g., K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. 1994).
401 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1551 (West 1998) (authorizing public agency to bring
paternity action to seek reimbursement for monies spent on support of child).
402 See, e.g., G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "there is
no such thing as dual fathership").
403 See Lipiano v. Lipiano, 598 A.2d 854, 857 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
404 See Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076, 1086 (Md. 1994) (ruling that husband who is not biological
parent only permitted custody if demonstrates that biological parent is unfit or exceptional circumstances
make such custody detrimental to the best interest of the child).
405 See Smith v. Jones, 566 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
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paternity gives the child the best of both worlds: the child can enjoy legitimacy as
to his mother's husband, but can also obtain child support, wrongful death benefits
or inheritance rights from his biological father.406 It also permits the biological
father who bears these responsibilities to prove his worthiness to participate in the
life of his child.407
Professor Mary Louise Fellows has argued that states should give serious
consideration to the concept of dual paternity, which may more clearly reflect the
realities of a child's complex life. She asks why courts have been reluctant to adopt
the dual paternity approach:
Is it because it would destroy the husband's power to prevent the
biological father from interfering in the husband's relationship
with his wife's child and would lead to public and legal
acknowledgment that the husband had "lost-control of his wife to
another man?" Is it also because dual paternity would thwart a
biological father who now can use the marital presumption as a
shield to avoid paternal responsibilities? Dual paternity would
increase the risk of forced fatherhood outside of marriage and
decrease the control of fatherhood inside of marriage. Both of
these consequences have little to do with children's welfare.
With the increasing prevalence of families created
through reproductive technology, families headed by same-sex
couples, non-secret adoptions, and blended families, it becomes
easier for the law to imagine and work out the details of dual
paternity .... What can be said in favor of dual paternity is that it
may be the right solution in some family circumstances.... Dual
paternity should not be dismissed merely on the basis of tradition
because, as I have tried to show, tradition frequently overlooked
concerns for equality and fairness.
408
These arguments concerning the benefits of dual paternity are worth
further exploration and consideration. It is premature to reject them when only
recently have we been confronted with the technology that can reveal biological
secrets that otherwise would have been hidden from view.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conflicting assumptions briefly outlined here cut to the core of
developing conceptions of the marital presumption of paternity. The lack of
uniformity among the states is largely the result of assumptions that courts believe
406 See T.D..v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 876 (La. 1999).
407 Id. at 877.
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are so obvious that they do not require any evidentiary foundation. Although the
legal trend is toward relying solely on biological ties to define paternity, the
dramatic disparities among the courts in their assumptions about the appropriate
determinants of paternity demonstrate the need to further analyze them and develop
a consensus about their validity. Some of these assumptions also raise concerns that
the treatment of the marital presumption of paternity reflects the power of the
different groups involved. By favoring families formed by marriage over families
formed without legal marriage, the presumption negatively affects the parental
rights of gay and lesbian couples and heterosexual unwed couples who raise
children together.40 9
The marital presumption of paternity also provides greater protection to
presumed fathers - those who want to maintain their father-child relationships and
those who want to rebut the presumption upon divorce - letting presumed marital
fathers have it both ways. Mothers are given little control over the decision of their
child's paternity, and when they attempt to exert control, they are viewed as selfish
or prevented from having their wishes considered because of their "unclean
hands." Nominal equality in family law disappears in this situation where the
mother's, but not the husband's, infidelity becomes consequential.410
Other situations also point to a lack of balance between men and women.
Several states have given constitutional weight to a putative biological father's
concerns, and those states that have rejected or limited his rights focus either on the
rights of the presumed father or the best interests of the child, not the choice of the
mother. Presumed fathers who have been forced to pay for their nonbiological
children's support also seem to wield considerable political power. In several
states, they have been able to legislatively reverse judicial decisions holding them
responsible for supporting their nonbiological children post-divorce, even if they
did not challenge the marital presumption during the divorce itself.411 In addition,
tort actions by husbands against the mothers for fraud or intentional infliction of
emotional distress for deceiving them about the biological heritage of children born
during their marriage are gaining judicial acceptance. This acceptance demonstrates
a judicial willingness to condemn the actions of mothers.412
409 See generally J. Shoshana Ehrlich, Co-Parent Visitation: Acknowledging the Reality of Two
Mother Families, 9 LAW & SEX. 151 (1999-2000).
410 See, for instance, NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178 (Ct. App. Va. 1989) (child conceived during the
couple's separation, during which both husband and wife "dated other people." Husband did not contest the
wife's testimony that he was told that she had sexual intercourse with others during their separation, yet he is
treated as an innocent party who acted under a mistaken belief, and the child's loss of the father's love and
support is not his fault). Judicial condemnation of women who did not reveal the biological paternity of their
child to their husbands is reflected in earlier paternity actions too. See, e.g., Winner v. Winner, 177 N.W.
680, 682 (Wis. 1920) (stating that "the concealment by the woman of the paternity of her child is a fault so
grievous that there is no excuse or palliation for it").
411 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
412 Several state courts have permitted causes of action for fraud and/or intentional infliction of
emotional distress to go to a jury. See Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868 (I11. App. CL 1996); G.A.W., 1if v.
D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198, 1199 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989); Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998). Two state courts have rejected this cause of action. See
Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 113 (Md. 2000); Nagy v. Nagy, 258 Cal. Rptr. 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing a
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The most disturbing feature of the trends in the law regarding the marital
presumption of paternity, however, is the failure to protect the interests of children.
As the Washington Supreme Court stated in State v. Santos, 4 3 "[d]espite the
numerous burdens and benefits of being a father.., it is the child who has the most
at stake in a paternity proceeding., 414 Courts often protect the choices of adults
over the best interests of children. Thus, even men who have clear reason to be
suspicious of their paternity are often commended for not pursuing genetic testing
to verify their biological fatherhood because it could destabilize their marriage.
Yet, little attention is given to children, who later experience abandonment by a
beloved father and who may have little chance at that point to establish a loving
father-child relationship with their biological father. Courts do not seem to consider
the possibility that, given the ready availability of genetic testing whenever the
marriage relationship deteriorates, children may be better protected by ensuring at
birth that their presumed father is willing, in light of all of the relevant information,
to assume a permanent father-child relationship toward them. Although courts often
repeat the rhetoric that the marital presumption of paternity protects children, this
presumption should be carefully scrutinized, and its workings rethought from the
ground up.
The analysis of the eroding marital presumption of paternity may be for
naught. In a society in which few adults can make lifetime commitments to each
other, there may be too few fathers willing to make such a commitment to the
children who enter their lives, whether by marriage or procreation. The sad reality
of children's lives may be that they will be lucky to have one parent consistently
love and care for them throughout their lives. The retreat from the marital
presumption of paternity may, however, provide an opportunity to design an
approach that will "foster responsible parenting" so that children will have the
strongest possible opportunity in these insecure times to have the consistent love
and support of their fathers.
non-biological parent to recover damages for developing a close relationship with a child misrepresented to
be his and performing parental act is not a 'damage' which should be compensable under law."). One state
court has permitted the husband to sue the wife's paramour for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See C.M. v. LM., 726 A.2d 998 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1999). For an argument on behalf of recognizing such torts,
see Linda L. Berger, Lies Between Mommy and Daddy: The Case for Recognizing Spousal Emotional
Distress Claims Based on Domestic Deceit that Interferes with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 Loy. L.A.
L.REv. 449 (2000).
413 702 P.2d 1179 (Wash. 1985).
414 Id. at 1180.
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